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WILLIAM B. TYE AND FRANK C. GRAVES*

The Economics of Negative Barriers to
Entry: How to Recover Stranded Costs
and Achieve Competition on Equal
Terms in the Electric Utility Industry
ABSTRACT
Stranded costs seem to be a major roadblock to structuring a
successful transitionto deregulationin the electric utility industry.
A majorpillar of this roadblockis the belief among some observers
that recovery of stranded costs is incompatible with competitive
markets and an impediment to a successful transition to
deregulation. We show that this is not the case by distinguishing
between strong and weak "competitive neutrality." Weak
competitive neutrality,essentially static economic efficiency, is an

amazingly robust property of stranded cost recovery mechanisms in

terms of preserving the true relative efficiency advantages of
competitors going forward. But, perhaps paradoxically, it is so
robust that weak competitive neutrality has little discriminatory
power to tell us what the appropriatelevel of revenue recovery
ought to be. For this determination, we need to consider the
additionaldimension that is recognizedin strong neutrality, that is,
both incumbents and entrantshave the same expectation of earning
their cost of capitalgoingforward.
INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY
The test for what we will call "strong" competitive neutrality is that
the stranded cost recovery mechanism, combined with the obligation of the
incumbent to amortize the sunk cost legacy from the past regulatory regime
with the revenues provided by the recovery mechanism, should in
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combination be neither a competitive advantage or disadvantage as far as
incumbents and entrants are concerned. Equally efficient incumbents and
entrants going forward should have the same expectation of earning their cost
of capital going forward. "Weak" competitive neutrality means only that both
incumbents and entrants should be free to compete for both existing and new
load on the basis of their competitive advantages or disadvantages arising
from true efficiency differences (real resource costs) going forward. Strong
competitive neutrality includes weak neutrality, but not vice versa.
Allowing incumbents a fair opportunity for recovery of stranded
costs as we have defined them during a transition to deregulation is not an
impediment to competition on equal terms. By defitition, a fair opportunity
for recovery of stranded costs creates competition on equal terms (and conversely) because it imposes on all competitors the same degree of exposure to
the legacy of sunk costs of the past regulatory regime. If done correctly, strong
neutral recovery of stranded costs achieves a "level playing field" because it
removes an artificial financial and competitive advantage arising (in the
absence of the stranded cost recovery mechanism) solely because entrants do
not bear the sunk cost of the past regulatory regime and incumbents do.
If the stranded cost recovery mechanism produces this result, it has
achieved strong competitive neutrality, insofar as the recovery mechanism
is incurred. All competitors would bear the full competitive advantages or
disadvantages arising solely from differences in non-stranded costs, that is,
true efficiency differences. The mechanism would thus also achieve weak
competitive neutrality.
Our article shows these results with some detailed examples.
However, there is nothing new or remarkable about the competitive
neutrality of stranded cost recovery. After all, there are numerous examples
of raising revenue through competitively netitral methods. Sales taxes are
one example. They create no artificial competitive advantages and
disadvantages as long as they are borne equally by all competitors, and they
can be designed to recover as little or as much as desired.
The sales tax analogy also points to a rather profound and perhaps
unexpected "robustness"' of weak competitive neutrality is defined solely
by preserving the relative true cost advantages of competitors going
forward. The playing field will be level regardless of whether the sales tax
is one percent or five percent or any other level-as long as the tax is indeed
recovered in a uniform, non-discriminatory manner. Thus, the narrow goal
of preserving forward-looking relative efficiency differences does not, by
itself, require any particular degree of recovery of sunk costs.

1. "Robustness" is a term of art used by economists to describe a property that tends
to be invariant with respect to assumed conditions.
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It is not so obvious that other possible stranded cost recovery
mechanisms, such as transmission or distribution surcharges, exit fees, and
the like, will also be weakly competitively neutral. However, we show that
any non-discriminatory mechanism will, in fact, be no different in effect
than a sales tax levy of equal magnitude on all competitors, despite differences in the formal means of recovery of the various proposed methods.
Moreover, any such mechanism that collects all and only the true stranded
costs will be strongly neutral, again regardless of means of collection.
A. The Stranded Cost Problem
The problem of "stranded costs" is undoubtedly the most vexatious
issue confronting customers, utilities, investors, and regulators in the
electric utility industry.2 Even when all parties can agree that a transition to
more competition and less regulation would be desirable, stranded costs
seem to be a major roadblock to structuring a successful transition.3 A major
pillar of this roadblock is the belief among some observers that recovery of
stranded costs is incompatible with competitive markets and an
impediment to a successful transition to deregulation." While charges of
anti-competitive effect have been commonly heard in the debate, there has

2. See Benjamin A. Holden, Shift to DeregulationMay Cost Electricity Industry $135
Billion, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 1995, at B4; See also Moody's Report Predicts $135-Billion in
Stranded Costs Over Next 10 Years, ELscriC UTIL. WK., Aug. 14, 1995, at 3. This figure
represents 80 percent of the equity base of the electric utility industry, according to the
Moody's Investor's Service, Stranded Costs Will Threaten Credit Quality of U.S. Electrics,
Aug. 1995.
3. See Benjamin A. Holden, Power Plays: Californias Struggle Shows How HardIt Is to
Deregulate Utilities, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 1995, at. Al, All; See also California Regulators
Approve Plan to DeregulateMarketfor Power by '98, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1995, at A2.
4. Typical of these claims, David W. Penn, Where Have You Gone, Dr. Kahn?,
ELEcRIcITY J., Dec. 1994, at 2-3, asserts:
Stranded cost payments have anticompetitive effects: They will delay or
prevent desired new competition-by erecting a barrier to entry for
alternative suppliers and trades; by discriminatorily favoring and
shielding certain individual competitors; by artificially giving an
entrenched competitor a paid-off asset with which to compete with rivals;
and by distorting transmission prices if such generation charges are placed
there....
Putting generation stranded cost charges on transmission is indeed a
tying arrangement.
See also Robert Michaels, Unused and Useless: The Strange Economics of Stranded Investment,
ELF-Rcrr'J., Oct. 1994, at 12-22. See also Peter Navarro, Electric Utilities:The Argumentfor
Radical Deregulation, HARv. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb., 1996, at 113-125; for a rebuttal, See Paul
Joskow, Does Stranded Cost Recovery Distort Competition?,ELncTicrrY J., Apr. 1996, at 31-45.
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been surprisingly little rigorous economic analysis of these claims. This
article seeks to fill that void.
Understanding the distinction between "weak" and "strong"
competitive neutrality' is the key to resolving many of the issues
surrounding stranded cost recovery. Under the current terms of the debate,
one side argues that recovery of stranded costs is essential to competition
on equal terms, economic efficiency, and avoidance of "uneconomic
bypass." The opponents of stranded cost recovery argue to the contrary that
denial of stranded cost recovery is necessary to accomplish these very same
aims. Introducing an entirely new set of concepts to the debate (weak vs.
strong competitive neutrality, the principle of imputation of stranded cost
recovery charges, etc.) moves the debate in a substantive way to illustrate
that both sides have erroneously focused on static economic efficiencies
(that is, weak competitive neutrality). Our analysis shows weak competitive
neutrality (static economic efficiency) to be achievable under a wide variety
of stranded cost mechanisms and virtually irrelevant to the choice among
them. Whether or not a particular amount or method of recovery of
stranded costs achieves static economic efficiency tells us almost nothing
about its desirability. There are good reasons for choosing among these
alternatives, but achieving static economic efficiency will not usually be one
of them.
The test for what we will call "strong" competitive neutrality is that
the stranded cost recovery mechanism, combined with the obligation of the
incumbent to amortize the sunk cost legacy from the past regulatory regime
with the revenues provided by the recovery mechanism, should in
combination be neither a competitive advantage or disadvantage as far as
incumbents and entrants are concerned. Equally efficient incumbents and
entrants going forward should have the same expectation of earning their
cost of capital going forward.
"Weak" competitive neutrality means only that both incumbents
and entrants should be free to compete for both existing and new load on
the basis of their competitive advantages or disadvantages arising from true

5. See William B.Tye, The Pricingof Inputs Sold to Competitors: Response, 11 YALE J.ON
REG., 203 (Winter 1994), and William B. Tye & Carlos Lapuerta, The Economics of Pricing
Network Interconnection:Theory and Application to the Market for Telecommunications in New
Zealand, 13 YALE J. ON REG.419 (Summer 1996), for further discussion of the distinction
between strong and weak competitive neutrality.
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efficiency differences (real resource costs) going forward.6 Strong
competitive neutrality includes weak neutrality, but not vice versa.
What are these "stranded costs"? There are numerous definitions
and disagreements over how to define "stranded costs." For the purposes
of this discussion, "stranded costs" are defined to be investments or cost
commitments made by incumbents in the prior regime of cost-of-service
regulation (that is, "sunk costs") that cannot expect to earn their cost of
capital and/or be recovered from customers under the proposed new rules
of competitive access to utility systems.7 Stranded costs are also sometimes
referred to as "transition costs."
Acceptable stranded cost recovery mechanisms should try to satisfy
as many as possible of the following criteria: reliable cost recovery,
competitive neutrality, allocational efficiency, fairness of incidence on
customers, transparency and predictability, administrative simplicity,
objectivity (few concerns about biases or distortions in the estimates),
automatic termination ("sunsetting"), and incentives to mitigate. Most of
these are familiar regulatory policy objectives, but the question of
competitive neutrality is relatively new, so it is examined in detail.
By our definition of stranded costs, we mean to convey the common
sense idea that stranded costs represent "negative barriers to entry" that
arise from competitive handicaps that originate purely because only
incumbents are burdened with the sunk costs arising in the past regulatory
regime.9 They do not arise from true efficiency advantages or disadvantages
6. More formally, weak competitive neutrality between two firms requires that the
firm with the lowest marginal cost always be able to successfully compete for business
against a higher marginal cost competitor in a winner-take-all contest. We accept this
standard for evaluating transition mechanisms for the purpose of argument here while
below questioning its validity in a competitive regime in the electric utility industry.
7. By this definition, we do not intend to depart from conventional definitions of
stranded costs and methods for measuring their magnitude. Note that a stranded cost may
have been "sunk" in the prior regime as a result of a contractual obligation, yet create
negative cash flows during the transition. Stranded costs may include fixed costs which will
continue to be borne in the future, such as out-of-market fuel contracts with strict take-orpay provisions. They can also include unavoidable future adjustment or exit costs, such as
labor severance costs. In general, any and all unavoidable "legacy" costs should be
recognized, but no avoidable or discretionary future costs.
8. "Barriers to entry" are generally defined in economics as cost advantages held by
incumbents over entrants. See Christian C. von Weizsdcker, A Welfare Analysis of Barriers to
Entry, 11 BELL J. EcON. 399 (1980). We have dubbed the reverse situation to be one of
.negative barriers to entry." By definition, the sunk cost disadvantages arising from
incumbency in the transition to deregulation are the stranded costs.
9. The problems of a transition to competition from regulation almost always arise as
a result of such legacies of the prior regulatory regime, which may create both competitive
advantages or disadvantages to incumbents. See JOHN R. MEYER & WILLIAM B. TYE, Toward
Achieving Workable Competition in Industries Undergoing a Transition to Deregulation: A
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of incumbency. Stranded costs thus represent an artificial competitive
asymmetry in favor of entrants that would not arise in a purely competitive
market' Entrants" obviously suffer no such handicaps from the legacy of
regulation, in the absence of a stranded cost recovery mechanism.
B. The Competitive Neutrality Test for Stranded Cost Recovery
How shall we know "competitive neutrality," a "level playing
field," or "competition on equal terms" when we see them? Intuitively, we
may thus propose' the following "smell test" for the strong competitive
neutrality of a stranded cost recovery mechanism. Given the combination
of (1)the burden of amortizing the sunk costs of the past regulatory regime,
(2) the revenues from the offsetting stranded cost recovery mechanism for
the incumbent, and (3) the absence of competitive advantages or
disadvantages arising from other sources (that is, assume "all else equal"),

Contractual Equilibrium Approach, Chapter 2.1 in WILLIAM B. TYE, THE TRANSmON TO
DEREuLATION 13,13-18 (QuoRuM BooKs 1991). We assume here the principle of bifurcation,
as discussed below, which means that competitive access pricing mechanisms are employed
separately to address and rectify any anti-competitive advantages arising solely from
incumbency. Bifurcation does not necessarily imply that stranded cost recovery mechanisms
are necessarily separate from other cost recovery mechanisms, however ( See discussion
below).
10. WilliamJ. Baumol, Paul L.Joskow, & Alfred E.Kahn (The Challenge for Federal and
State Regulators: Transition from Regulation to Efficient Competition in Electric Power,
submitted to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Docket No. RM95-8-000,
et al., Dec. 4, 1994) identify the following mutually non-exclusive categories of stranded
costs:
The three main categories of potential stranded costs are: (1) past
investments in utility-owned generation whose total costs exceed the
prices that either do prevail in markets that are already competitive or
would prevail in that event; (2) power purchase contracts (most often with
non-utility companies), which the utilities were forced to undertake, based
on forecasts of costs and prices that have turned out to be too high; and (3)
regulatory assets-including deferred taxes, costs of post-retirement
employee benefits, nuclear decommissioning costs and other expenses
capitalized for rate-making purposes such as DM-which could similarly
not be recovered in competition with generators not similarly burdened.
See also Steven C. Anderson, et al, Electricity Transition Costs, (Oct. 22,1993) (draft available
from Harvard Electricity Policy Group, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University).
11. We use the term "entrant" generally to describe firms that seek to serve customers
in a service territory newly opened to competitive access. The "incumbent" is the prior
certificated utility which previously served the customer. The entrant may well be an
incumbent firm in an adjacent service territory-one which in fact may have incurred
stranded costs in connection with providing that service as well. (This case is considered
below.)
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would an investor prefer to be the entrant or the incumbent? If the stranded
cost recovery mechanism produces indifference to this choice, it has
achieved strong competitive neutrality, insofar as the recovery mechanism
is incurred. All competitors would bear the full competitive advantages or
disadvantages arising solely from differences in non-stranded costs, that is,
true efficiency differences.
Allowing incumbents a fair opportunity for recovery of stranded
costs as we have defined them during a transition to deregulation is not an
impediment to competition on equal terms. By definition, a fair opportunity
for recovery of stranded costs creates competition on equal terms (and
conversely) because it imposes on all competitors the same degree of
exposure to the legacy of sunk costs of the past regulatory regime. If done
correctly, strong neutral recovery of stranded costs achieves a "level playing
field" because it removes an artificial financial and competitive advantage
arising (in the absence of the stranded cost recovery mechanism) solely
because entrants do not bear the sunk cost of the past regulatory regime and
incumbents do.
Before we show this result with some detailed examples, it might
be helpful to consider that there is nothing new or remarkable about the
competitive neutrality of stranded cost recovery. After all, there are
numerous examples of raising revenue through competitively neutral
methods. Sales taxes are one example. They create no artificial competitive
advantages and disadvantages as long as they are borne equally by all
competitors, and they can be designed to recover as little or as much as
desired (ignoring income effects).
Consider a group of merchants selling oriental rugs in a highly
competitive market at a bazaar. Assume that all merchants are price takers
and only earn a competitive rate of return, so that the same rug would sell
for the same price. They seek to pay the rent on a previously constructed
facility that will be used by all merchants. Obviously, if one merchant had
to pay the cost of the building, that merchant would be at a competitive
disadvantage. If all merchants assess themselves an equal sales tax that they
pay into an escrow fund to pay the rent, all merchants are free to compete
on equal terms on the basis of their true efficiency differences going
forward. The sales tax the customer pays on a rug of equivalent price is the
same regardless of which merchant he or she patronizes. And the
competitive neutrality is the same whether we assess the levy on the
merchants (who include it as a cost of business in their prices) or on the
customers directly. As we shall show, the same result holds even if only one
merchant is obligated legally to pay the rent, but is allowed to assess an
actuarially fair sales tax (access charge) on all other merchants that exactly
offsets the per unit liability. Finally, customers will get the benefits of true
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efficiency gains as a result of competitive pressures on the rug merchants,
despite the requirement to fund the escrow account to pay the rent.
The sales tax analogy also points to a rather profound and perhaps
unexpected "robustness" of weak competitive neutrality as defined solely
by preserving the relative true cost advantages of competitors going
forward. The playing field will be levelized regardless of whether the sales
tax is one percent or five percent or any other level-as long as the tax is
indeed recovered in a uniform, non-discriminatory manner. Thus, the
narrow goal of preserving forward-looking relative efficiency differences
does not, by itself, require any particular degree of recovery of sunk costs
(whether for the tents of the bazaar or for the sunk costs of prudent but now
out-of-market investments made under utility regulation).
Weak competitive neutrality is an amazingly robust property of
revenue recovery mechanisms in terms of preserving the true relative
efficiency advantages of competitors going forward. But, perhaps
paradoxically, it is so robust that weak competitive neutrality (defined as
preserving true relative efficiency differences of competitors) has little
discriminatory power to tell us what the level of revenue recovery ought to
be. For this determination, we need to consider an additional
dimension-such as how much rent must be paid every month-that is
recognized in strong neutrality.
All analogies break down at some point, so it might be useful to
illustrate a simple case of a competitively neutral stranded cost recovery for
utilities to motivate the discussion that follows. Suppose that it were
possible for electric utility stranded costs as we have defined them to be
accurately identified up front and paid by a third party who agreed to
assume the liability in exchange for the right to assess all competitors
reasonable non-discriminatory fees necessary to amortize the liability.
Obviously, this mechanism, if successfully implemented, would be
competitively neutral.
It is not so obvious that other possible stranded cost recovery
mechanisms, such as transmission or distribution surcharges, exit fees, and
the like, will also be weakly competitively neutral. However, we will show
below that any non-discriminatory mechanism will, in fact, be no different
in effect than a sales tax levy of equal magnitude on all competitors in our
rug bazaar, despite differences in the formal means of recovery of the
various proposed methods. Moreover, any such mechanism that collects all
and only the true stranded costs will be strongly neutral again regardless
of means of collection.
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C. Goals for Stranded Recovery Mechanisms
We are now in a position to define more precisely the goals for the
recovery mechanism for stranded costs:
1. Provide a mechanism for reliable collection of the revenues
required to fully amortize the legacy of stranded costs;
2. Allow both incumbents and entrants the opportunity to
compete on equal terms to recover fixed costs not sunk in the
prior regulatory regime and not stranded as a result of the
transition to deregulation;
3. Limit the duration and magnitude of the recovery
mechanism in the transition only to true stranded costs (for
example, encourage mitigation and sunsetting);
4. Allow all competitors to realize the competitive advantages
of any true efficiencies they have going forward;
5. Promote price and service competition among competing
suppliers so that true efficiency gains will tend to benefit
customers in the long run;
6. Minimize transaction costs of administering the transition;
and
7. Ensure that the transition costs are borne by customers in
an equitable way.
The strong form of competitive neutrality is concerned with the full
recovery of sunk costs on equal terms and is addressed by the first three
goals. The basic idea behind strong competitive neutrality is that all equally
efficient competitors should have an equal fair opportunity to expect to earn
their cost of capital, that is, to recover fixed or sunk costs in the transition.
The first goal achieves this equal opportunity by using stranded cost
recovery to offset the sunk cost liabilities from the prior regulatory regime
which would otherwise be unrecoverable in the competitive environment.
The second and third goals assure that both incumbents and entrants will
face going forward exactly the same risk of recovering any fixed costs not
deemed stranded from the transition (in particular, any new fixed costs
incurred after the transition). Put differently, all investments (both new and
old, for incumbents and entrants) will expect to earn their cost of capital
after the transition-stranded costs because of the recovery mechanism and
non-stranded fixed costs because they are expected to earn (at least) their
cost of capital in the transition even without the recovery mechanism (else
new investments would never take place during and after the transition in

an economically rational capital market).
The present discussion focuses on weak competitive neutrality, but
some brief comments explaining the economic rationale for strong
competitive neutrality are in order. Much of the discussion to date has
focused on investor expectations and the equity and efficiency rationale for
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a transition mechanism from a regime of strict regulation to more
competition. The transition ought to preserve a fair opportunity for
investors to expect to earn their cost of capital on prudent investments
made in the prior regulatory regime. Competitive symmetry with respect
to the expectation that all investments, both old and new, will earn their
cost of capital is the heart of the strong competitive neutrality rationale for
stranded cost recovery.12
There are many legal and economic arguments in favor of a
transition mechanism that preserves that expectation. The Supreme Court,
in Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989), identified a test of
"constitutional magnitude" that surely would be flunked by a complete
disallowance of stranded cost recovery, given the magnitudes involved:
The risks a utility faces are in large part defined by the rate
methodology because utilities are virtually always public
monopolies dealing in an essential service, and so relatively
immune to the usual market risks. Consequently, a State's
decision to arbitrarily switch back and forth between
methodologies in a way in which required investors to bear
the risk of bad investments at some times while denying them
the benefit of good investments at others would raise serious
constitutional questions. But the instant case does not present
this question.13
From an economic point of view, a regulatory regime that sets
revenue requirements so that the expected rate of return allows investors
to expect to earn the cost of capital balances the best interests of both
investors and ratepayers. An expected rate of return above the cost of
capital makes customers overpay and an expected rate of return less than
the cost of capital shortchanges investors. Such a rate of return denies the
company the ability to attract capital, to maintain its financial integrity, and
to expect a rate of return commensurate with that on other enterprises

12. Some critics of stranded cost recovery offer a third dimension of competitive
neutrality, sometimes expressed as a fairness test. This test concerns the fact that some

utilities have "written off" past investment mistakes in the prior regulatory regime while
others did not. Allegedly, those who have already written off these costs are being treated

asymmetrically. But this is not the case if these excess costs were written off as part of an
agreement with regulators. These costs would never have been recovered anyway had the
prior regime of regulation continued, unlike true stranded costs. Of course, it may be the

case that some excess costs would not have been recoverable from ratepayers because of
competitive pressures even in the prior regulatory regime. But that will also be true in the
stranded cost recovery regime (See discussion of this case below). The objective of the
recovery should be to allow investors in the incumbent the same opportunity to expect to
earn their cost of capital as a fair regulatory system under the prior regulatory regime.
13. Duquesne Light Co., v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299,309 (1989).
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attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties." The economic rationale
for maintaining that expectation in the transition is really no different than
the rationale for creating that expectation in the first place." Regulatory
agencies such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) have
developed numerous rate methodologies to prevent arbitrary windfalls or
losses during regulatory transitions. 6
Critics of stranded cost recovery sometimes claim that investors in
electric utilities need not be afforded such an expectation during the
transition because they have been previously compensated for the risks of
stranded assets. 17 As it turns out, the economic principles of asymmetric risk
imply that even if: (1) investors are fully cognizant of the risks, (2) capital
market prices fully reflected such risks, and (3) regulators always set the
allowed rate of return equal to the true cost of capital, it is mathematically
impossible for investors to have been previously compensated
automatically for these risks."
Apart from the arguments that recovery of stranded costs would
impede weak competitive neutrality (which we address below) and the
argument that investors have already been compensated for these risks
(which we address elsewhere), economic arguments against stranded cost
recovery appear to come down to expediency-customers can get away
with "stiffing" investors as a last parting shot under the old regulatory
scheme, without the adverse consequences for economic efficiency that
would otherwise prevail under continuation of the old regulatory regime.

14. See A. LAWRENCE KOLBE frAL., The Cost of Capital MIT. PRESS (1984).
15. The belief that setting rates in a manner so that investors in regulated industries can
expect to earn the cost of capital is the pillar upon which rests most of the application of
financial economics to regulated industries. See Stewart C. Myers, The Application of Finance
Theory to Public Utility Rate Cases, 3 BELL J. ECON. 58 (1972). See also discussion by Baumol,
Joskow, and Kahn supra note 10.
16. Transitions of regulatory rules that have the potential for creating arbitrary
windfalls and losses to customers and investors have been part of the regulatory scene for
many years. Treatment of deferred income taxes and accounting for inflation are two notable
examples. For a discussion of the rationale for avoiding arbitrary windfall gains and losses
and for the mechanics of how to do so, see Stewart C. Myers & A. Lawrence Kolbe, Inflation
and Rate of Return Regulation, 2 RES.TRANSl. ECON. 83 (1985); See also A. Lawrence Kolbe,
William B. Tye, & Miriam Alexander Baker, Conditionsfor Investorand CustomerIndiference
Among Regulatory Treatments of DeferredIncome Taxes, 15 RAND J. ECON.434 (1984).
17. For this claim,see Irwin M. Seltzer, Stranded Investment: Who Pays the Bill?, Remarks
at the Southwestern Electric Exchange, American Enterprise Institute, March 30,1994. See
also Stelzer, Restructuringthe Electric Utility Industry: FurtherTentative Thoughts, ELECTRICITY
J., Oct. 1994, at 36-41,for a revision of some of these views.
18. See A. Lawrence Kolbe and William B. Tye, It Ain I In There: The Cost of CapitalDoes
Not CompensateforStranded-CostRisk, Pus. UrIL. FORT., May 15,1995, at 26-28. Those wishing
to pursue the matter further are referred to A. Lawrence Kolbe & William B. Tye,
Compensationfor the Risk of Stranded Costs, 24 ENERGY POL'Y (1996) at 1025-1050.
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The apparent logic is that customers will no longer need to depend on
investors' expectations of fair treatment in a new regime of competition.
This argument ignores the fact that the transition to competition could be
quite lengthy for electric utilities. Regulation of competitive access,
transmission pricing, etc., could continue for quite some time, if not
indefinitely." "It ain't over til it's over," as they say.
The weak form of competitive neutrality is addressed by the fourth
goal. The objective here is to prevent the stranded cost recovery mechanism
from undercutting the ability of all competitors, incumbents and entrants
alike, from utilizing any true cost efficiencies they may have which do not
arise from the legacy of sunk costs from the prior regulatory regime. As
noted, weak neutrality is extremely robust with regard to alternative ways
of achieving strong neutrality. This rather profound result permits us to
concentrate on achieving strong neutrality, which we shall show is the
much more important and useful condition, embodying "going forward"
efficiency with no relative financial disadvantages for any party. This means
competition will be fair and will allow dynamic competition on equal terms
for new products and services that require investments as well as efficient
operations.
Finally, our last three goals ensure that customers are fairly treated
in the transition. The fifth goal ensures that stranded cost recovery does not
interfere with the emergence of a truly competitive wholesale power market
and that customers benefit from the true efficiency gains realized in the
transition and beyond. The last goals ensure that the incidence of the
recovery among customers is non-discriminatory and that the cost of
administering the transition is minimized. In some ways, these have little
to do with neutrality but much to do with public acceptance of the
mechanism as fair and reasonable. Hence, they should be regarded as
constraints on any stranded cost recovery mechanism.
Focusing on our standard of competitive neutrality, the recovery
mechanism must accomplish three important features during the transition:
1. Self-limiting in time: Once the legacy of stranded costs has
been amortized, the asymmetry arising from past regulation
has ended, along with the recovery mechanism.
2. Self-limiting in scope: Since the asymmetry of past
regulation applies to only a portion of the incumbents' costs,
only that portion should be recovered under the mechanism.
Recovery of all other incumbents' costs in markets opened to
effective competition (including new investments) would be

19. A. Lawrence Kolbe, William B. Tye, & Stewart C. Myers, Response to Book Review, 13
YALE J.ON REG. 413 (winter 1996).
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exposed to competitive risk during the transition, just as they
are for the entrants.
3. Comparability: Recovery of stranded costs is simply the flip
side of equal access to facilities such as transmission and
distribution that would otherwise create anti-competitive
asymmetries that favor incumbents. The legacy of both
incumbents' assets and liabilities should be purged of
artificial impediments of effective competition-but comparability is a two-way street.20
Restatement of the issue as correcting for artificial negative barriers
to entry also permits some rather important insights into how recovery of
stranded costs can be used to permit competition on equal terms. First, the
problem is one of requiring all competitors to face the costs of the legacy of
the prior regulatory regime on equal terms as a condition to compete. To
date, debate over whether regulators should require customers rather than
investors in incumbent firms to bear these costs has tended to obscure the
competitive neutrality issue.
Second, the problem of recovering stranded costs to achieve
competition on equal terms is really nothing new. Experience in other
industries undergoing regulatory transitions towards increased competition
can shed light on alternative means of measuring and collecting out-ofmarket sunk costs. In the transition to deregulation in the New Zealand
telecommunications industry, the regulatory policy is defined to be
achieving "competitive neutrality" in the funding of public service
obligations through a levy on all market participants, while achieving
competition on equal terms for network interconnection. In the United
Kingdom electric system, all distribution companies (RECs) were required
to enter long-term "contracts for differences" (CFDs) for a proportionate
share of the out-of-market coal costs imposed on the generators.
This leads us to a major insight: the idea of bifurcating the thinking
on the stranded cost recovery from the thinking on the access (that is,
transmission) pricing. We need to be very clear in what we mean by this
bifurcation, however. As the FERC recognized in combining its
transmission access and stranded cost recovery proceedings, the issues of
access pricing and stranded cost recovery must be examined in tandem
because policies with regard to the access will cause the cost stranding.
20. We recognize that there may well be continued asymmetries that favor or disfavor
incumbents that are a permanent feature of the regulatory scheme. For example, a residual
obligation to serve may well be imposed on incumbents, if only in the threat to re-regulate
if the transition fails. It may be necessary to compensate incumbents for these residual
obligations. However, we view these not as sunk cost legacies of the prior period of
regulation, but rather as future regulatory mechanisms that must be addressed and
compensated on a permanent basis and are not part of a regulatory transition.
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Nevertheless, as a practical matter, the stranded cost recovery mechanism
may be combined with other charges, and transmission access charge is
only one of the possible candidates. Nor does bifurcation mean that the
utility will necessarily de-integrate generation from transmission and
distribution as part of its stranded cost recovery mechanism2' or place
stranded costs into an entirely separate corporate entity with the duty to
amortize stranded costs with levies on all market participants, although it
may wish to do so. Bifurcation only means that we will segment the
stranded cost problem for separate measurement and examine the
consequences of alternative recovery mechanisms for competitive neutrality
irrespective of the particular transmission pricing mechanism chosen. These
pricing mechanisms for stranded cost recovery might be combined in the
final charge, or separately specified in the billing arrangement.2
As explained in more detail in Section V, there are perhaps two
main lessons to borrow from the experience in the U.S. natural gas industry
and apply to the electric industry. First is that stranded costs are so difficult
to estimate that flexible, adaptive mechanisms for their recovery ought to
be allowed. This flexibility can include allowing different means of
estimating costs, different means of collecting them, and means of resetting
the allowances. Second, lump-sum, pay-when-you-go approaches (such as
the FERC's proposed electric exit fees) are not strictly necessary, nor are
they necessarily preferred by customers. Both customers and the utilities
may prefer the clarity of a charge like a gas inventory charge (GIC) that is
unbundled regardless of customer switching to third-party suppliers.
As explained in more detail below, the U.S. telecommunications
industry is not a perfect analog for the electric industry, largely because of
its extremely strong growth. However, the telecommunications industry has
a significant bypass problem which causes "lost contributions" or stranded

21. Utilities Urged to Break Up Companies to Recover Stranded Costs Under NOPR, ELWcnIC
UTIL. WK., May 8,1995, at 5.
22. We have chosen the term "bifurcation" to avoid the confusions surrounding the
terms "bundling" and "unbundling." There are a variety of mechanisms proposed for
isolating and collecting stranded charges for which the "utbundling" term might be applied.
For example, it has been suggested that stranded costs be isolated into a separate corporate
entity that would recover all stranded costs from all customers or all competitors in a
competitively neutral manner. It has been debated whether the stranded cost recovery
mechanism should be recovered in a charge bundled with transmission access or recovered
separately from customers. It has been debated whether all competitors (including the
incumbent) should pay the charge, or only entrants. As will become clear below, none of
these options is foreclosed by the requirement of competitive neutrality in a broad range of
circumstances, and so we are making no predeterminations with regard to these issues. The
point of bifurcation is to isolate the stranded cost recovery mechanism to determine its effect
on competition on equal terms independent of other issues such as access pricing of
transmission.
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costs, and they have used a few mechanisms that could be very attractive
to electric utilities:
1. Accelerated depredation of at-risk assets: These are copper
cables and analog switches for telecommunications carriers,
primarily generation for utilities. A swap of depredation
between transmission and generation could achieve this
without any rate increases.
2. Access charges: Somewhat like the gas industry, the
telecommunications industry has addressed its transition
costs with a recovery mechanism that is applied globally, to
all customers rather than with a customer-specific exit fee.
This may be significantly simpler administratively than the
exit fee approach, especially at the retail level. Unlike the
telecommunications industry, the electric industry could seek
to make its access charges non-bypassable and non-distorting,
that is, demand charges not usage (per kWh) charges.
3. Price-cap regulation: A shift to price-cap regulation was
justified in the telecommunications industry because of its
high growth and rapidly emerging competition in all aspects
of supply. The electric industry is not quite so naturally
poised, but there is a potentially valuable role for incentive
regulation of some kind during restructuring: It will prove
both difficult and controversial to forecast expected stranded
costs, net of reasonable mitigation. An incentive scheme could
allow "light-handed" regulation of the stranded cost recovery
mechanism itself, for example, by allowing revenuerequirement mitigating cost reductions to be shared between
ratepayers and shareholders. This would give utility
managers a stronger, unambiguous incentive to find such
opportunities, and customers assurance that they are
participating in such savings without onerous regulatory
reviews.
D. Is Recovery of Stranded Costs Inherently Anticompetitive?
Many of those who object to recovery of stranded costs would label
any method of recovery as inherently anti-competitive and inconsistent
with competition. To them, a competitively neutral method of collecting
revenues to fund stranded costs is an oxymoron.
Skeptics claim that stranded cost recovery would distort price
signals, result in inefficient decisionmaking, and unfairly favor the least
efficient utilities. To a large degree, these claims rest on the belief that
stranded costs do not represent a legacy of regulation but, rather, inherent
inefficiencies among utilities. According to this logic, a transition to
competition should reward efficiency and punish inefficiency, and recovery
of stranded costs allegedly does just the opposite. These skeptics define

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 37

competition
as a market environment purged of any recovery of stranded
3
2

costs.

While we disagree with this view, it is interesting to note that it
would achieve weak competitive neutrality, in that it dearly reveals relative
efficiency differences in prices. However, that standard is so easily achieved
that it does not inform the debate about stranded cost recovery at all. That
is, an electric sales tax to recover nothing is just as competitively neutral and
non-distortive of relative prices as a sales tax to recover some or all of the
stranded costs.
We show below that, if true efficiency gains are realizable from the
introduction of competition, customers can and will realize the benefits of
those efficiencies as reflected in prices in a competitive power market and
pay lower rates than would have been charged under a continuation of the
prior regime of regulation, full recovery of stranded costs notwithstanding.
Customers, therefore, will expect to pay lower rates than otherwise would
occur under continuing regulation as a result of true efficiency gains going
forward in a transition with stranded cost recovery. (Of course, this may not
be as satisfying to customers wanting even lower rates from avoiding
responsibility for sunk costs altogether, but it will still be beneficial and
efficient.)
However, a successful transition mechanism will tend to produce
price levels higher than those otherwise prevailing in a de novo competitive
regime (without stranded costs), by the amount of the allowance for
recovery of stranded costs. This conclusion follows from the definition of
stranded costs and the fact that a successful recovery mechanism is
designed to achieve strong competitive neutrality. The claim of anticompetitive consequences merely on the basis that retail prices are higher
than would otherwise occur is thus nothing more than simply an objection
to the idea of achieving strong competitive neutrality with full stranded cost
recovery. While the argument may be couched in the language of

23. See Stranded-Cost Recovery Will Slow Competition Where Needed Most: RDI, ELECTRIC
UTIL. WK., Nov. 13, 1995, at 2:
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's provisions for
stranded-cost recovery in its open-access rulemaking will significantly
slow the onset of competitive power markets, a new report from Boulder,
Colo.-based Resource Data International concluded.
"Full recovery of stranded investment will erode the competitive
advantage of utilities that have made prudent investment decisions and
carry little stranded investment," RDI said.
Stranded-cost recovery will slow the onset of competition particularly
in California, Illinois, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Texas-states
with the highest stranded investment and the highest electricity costswhere customers have the most to gain from competitive markets, the
report said.
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competition, it is really an argument about income distribution-that
incumbents, not customers, should bear transition costs. (While we are
prepared to debate this issue, it is not one about achieving competition on
equal terms, and so will not be addressed further herein.)
At the most basic level, it is simply not true that recovery of
stranded costs is inherently incompatible with competitive markets. After
all, lease agreements in competitive markets frequently incorporate "exit
fees" and other contract deficiency or termination provisions that give
customers options while encouraging suppliers to make long-term
commitments or investors to make idiosyncratic investments in risky
markets. These contractual agreements are binding even when the
associated costs are out-of-market, as utility stranded costs are by
definition.
Other claims about anti-competitive consequences simply rest on
a confusion about how to measure the differences in true economic
efficiency going forward. The key to strong competitive neutrality is to
ensure that the sunk cost burden is funded in a way that neutralizes the
competitive effect of the legacy, and only those sunk cost differences. If so,
then incumbents compete on the basis of their true relative efficiencies or
inefficiencies going forward and each competitor bears its proportionate
share of the sunk cost legacy of the past regulatory regime. There is thus
nothing inherently anti-competitive about stranded cost recovery if it
achieves both weak and strong competitive neutrality as discussed above.
Despite these reassurances, many customers and potential entrants
are likely to be unpersuaded. There persists a belief that recovery of
stranded costs is a reward to inefficiency and a mechanism for conferring
artificial competitive advantages to those allegedly least deserving-high
cost firms.
We show this not to be true under a competitively neutral
successful stranded cost recovery mechanism. To do so, we first identify the
specific mechanisms by which it is claimed that stranded cost recovery is
anti-competitive. Then we examine the FERC's proposed "lost revenues"
mechanism and other proposed mechanisms to test for competitive
neutrality. Next, we consider a proffered counterexample alleged to show
that stranded cost recovery is anti-competitive. This alleged counterexample
shows that competitive neutrality is in fact achieved by successful stranded
cost recovery. We examine the consequences of anticipated excess capacity
and errors in measuring and funding stranded costs. Finally, we consider
the consequences of allowing recovery based on forecasting stranded costs
(ex ante method) versus allowing recovery based on actual costs (ex post
method).
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I. THE DEBATE TO DATE OVER STRANDED COST RECOVERY
A. Rationale Behind the Claims of a Supposed Conflict Between
Competition and Stranded Cost Recovery: the Cajun Opinion
The D.C. Circuit found in Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v.
FERC that the FERC should hold an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether recovery of stranded investment costs as part of an open access
tariff was anti-competitive and would preclude mitigation of alleged
market power.2'
There is a great deal of confusion, particularly associated with the
Cajun decision, over whether the recovery of stranded costs represents an
impediment to competition:
What is inescapably before the Commission at this juncture
is its validation of the concept of stranded investment,
because-not surprising really-its view on this matter may
itself dictate market structure. The Commission must address
whether the [transmission tariff's] provision of a process for
recovery of stranded investment costs is itself a deal killer
that, perhaps ironically, precludes genuine open access to
Entergy's transmission system. In short, the question that
allows
must be asked now is whether the [transmission tariff]
"
for "meaningful access to alternative suppliers. o25
The challenged transmission tariff included a charge for stranded
costs as part of the charge for the transmission service. The Court expressed
two major reasons why the recovery of stranded costs might be anticompetitive and that the transmission tariff as a whole (that is, including
stranded cost recovery) "seems to provide [the incumbent] with the means
to stifle the very competition it purports to create."
The first is that such recovery would "in essence" be a tying
arrangement:
if a company can charge a former customer for the fixed cost
of its product whether or not the customer wants that
product, and can tie this cost to the delivery of a bottleneck
monopoly product that the customer must purchase, the

24. Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. FERC, 28 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Cajun).
The actual ruling of the Court went to the FERC procedures, not the substance of the issues:
"We find that the Commission failed to adequately address these and other concerns raised
by the petitioners and conclude that it was arbitrary and capricious in declining to conduct
hearings." [footnote omitted.)
25. Western Systems Power Pool, 55 F.E.R.C. [ 61,099 at 61,317 (1991).
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products are as effectively tied as they would be in a
traditional tying arrangement.
The second alleged reason for anticompetitive consequence is that
the recovery of stranded costs creates an alleged "odd asymmetry" which
may actually serve to increase the entity's market power:
while [the incumbent] can compete for generation sales
outside its transmission grid without concern for a stranded
investment charge, [the incumbent's] competitors cannot
compete for the customers on its transmission system on the
same basis. As a theoretical matter, then, the petitioners
would appear to be correct that the stranded investment
provision is anticompetitive.
Substantively, then, the argument that stranded cost recovery is an
anticompetitive "deal killer" boils down to what we will call (1) the "tying"
argument' and (2) the "competitive asymmetry" argument.
To meet both the concerns of the Court, we return in detail to these
issues below and show that stranded cost recovery mechanisms should be
structured so that they are both strongly and weakly competitively neutral.
With strong competitive neutrality, all suppliers to a market (that is, the
incumbent utility as well as its competitors) will equally bear the charges
associated with full stranded investment recovery. They will therefore be
able to compete on a level playing field. (Note that this does not imply that
each utility's stranded cost surcharge must be of the same magnitude. Our
examples will prove this.) In this way, the incumbent utility would no
longer be unilaterally handicapped through these costs associated with past
regulatory mandates, continuing social programs, and sunk investments
that are unrecoverable in a market environment. Similarly, the weak
competitive neutrality property insures that no market participant is given
a competitive advantage or disadvantage in its effort to serve wholesale or
retail customers on the basis of its true efficiency advantages or
disadvantages going forward. Thus, weak competitive neutrality prevents
any tying that would impede ability to compete on equal terms in the
generation market.
We turn now to an examination of the proposed methods for
recovery of stranded costs in the electric utility industry. We then consider
an alleged counterexample which purports to show that stranded cost
recovery will not achieve competitive neutrality.

26. In the pages that follow, our working definition of "tying" will be a broad one-any
situation where a monopolist uses its ownership of a bottleneck facility (in this case
transmission) to prevent competition on equal terms in another market (in this case
generation).
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B. The FERC's "Revenues Lost" Method

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)z identified the
stranded cost problem as associated with a "departing customer" and
concluded that recovery of "legitimate and verifiable transition costs" will
permit all competitors to "compete on a more equal footing in competitive
bulk power markets." Although case-specific proposals would not be
foreclosed in some circumstances, the Commission endorsed the "direct
assignment of stranded costs to departing customers" via a variant of the
"exit fee" approach. Utilities would be allowed to recover the "legitimate
and prudent obligations the utility undertook" in connection with serving
the customer.
The Commission labeled its preferred approach the "revenues lost"
method. Recoverable stranded costs are the difference between a customer's
revenues reasonably foreseeable under regulation and reasonably
foreseeable revenues under competition.' Transmission revenues and
mitigationr would be accounted for as well. The Commission requested

27. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), in Docket No. RM94-7-O01,
Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities (March 29,1995),
concluded that "we do not believe the existing supplier's shareholders or its remaining
customers should have to bear costs that were prudently incurred under the old regulatory
system to serve the departing customer." The FERC also stated that it believed that the
States should allow recovery of stranded costs as a result of competitive access decisions at
the state level. Whether and how utilities will be able to recover costs stranded as a result
of retail competitive access decisions implemented at the state level will continue to be
debated. However, the matter (at least in principle, if not in implementation) seems to be
settled at the federal level (pending judicial review). The FERC has yet to approve a stranded
cost recovery mechanism for the electric utilities that has withstood judicial scrutiny. See also
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Promoting Wholesale Competition through Open
Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded
Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities; Order No. 888, Final Rule, issued Apr.
24,1996.
28. More formally, the Commission defined stranded costs as follows:
(1) Wholesale stranded cost means any legitimate, prudent and verifiable
cost incurred by a public utility or a transmitting utility to provide service
to:
(i) a wholesale requirements customer that subsequently becomes, in
whole or in part, an unbundled wholesale transmission services
customer of such public utility or transmitting utility; or
(ii) a retail customer, or newly created wholesale power sales
customer, that subsequently becomes, in whole or in part, an
unbundled wholesale transmission services customer of such public
utility or transmitting utility.
29. The Commission stated that mitigation is automatically accounted for by the
reduction of stranded costs by the competitive price of power, apparently under the belief
that these revenues could be recovered from another sale at the competitive price if the
customer exits the system.
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comments as to whether the utility should use the "up front" approach
(which we call ex ante below) or track the actual selling price and future
costs with a periodic "true up" over time (which we call the ex post
approach).
The Commission contemplated that states would recover retail
stranded costs in retail rates, and observed that most commentors agree that
the level of potential wholesale stranded costs (subject to FERC jurisdiction)
is small relative to that of retail stranded costs (subject to state public utility
commission jurisdiction).
Defining stranded costs to be associated with departing customers
naturally tends to lead to the exit fee approach to cost recovery. This
tendency is further reinforced by the jurisdictional distinction between
wholesale and retail service. The same assets often serve both markets, but
only customers lie uniquely in one category. Since FERC only regulates
wholesale services, it took a customer approach. The logic is that the fee
prevents the shifting of stranded costs from departing customers to
remaining customers or shareholders (fulfilling a fairness standard). The
logic for this method also tends to be reinforced by the fact that buyer-seller
relationships in interstate bulk power markets under the FERC's
jurisdiction tend to be subject to contracts (as opposed to the prevalence of
many tariff sales in retail markets regulated by the states). And it appears
designed to respond to the Court's concerns that putting the recovery
mechanism into the transmission tariff would possibly constitute an
anticompetitive tying arrangement.
C. Other Proposed Mechanisms
The FERC identified several other possible recovery mechanisms
in addition to the "revenues lost" method. The first is what we will call the
"cost-of-service" approach. With this method, regulators would develop a
total company estimate of stranded costs by looking at contractual
liabilities, regulatory assets, certain social program costs, etc. These will be
allocated among customers after accounting for wheeling service revenues
and mitigation measures.
The other method the Commission looked at was the "netting" or
"market analysis" method. It would rely on an analysis of the market value
of stranded assets, as opposed to regulatory valuations, to determine the
estimate of stranded costs. It appears designed to capture expectations
about excess capacity in a competitive power market (that is, the inability
of even efficient incumbents to recover total costs). Otherwise, it appears to
be similar to the cost-of-service approach.
Because the Commission viewed stranded costs as arising from
departing customers, it did not seriously consider recovery mechanisms
that rely upon charges to competitors, such as those seeking access to
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transmission and distribution, or simply granting permission to utilities to
raise transmission rates up to market clearing levels in exchange for
absorbing losses from stranded costs in generation.
Assuming (1) that the ability to recover stranded costs as a legal
matter does not change, (2) that the definition and measurement of stranded
cost does not change, and (3) that the administrative burden of assessing
competitors is no different from that of assessing departing customers, we
show below that the competitive effects of the various collection methods
are identically competitively neutral. There may however be strong
regulatory, legal, or reasons other than achieving competitive neutrality to
prefer one method over another."
II. HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLES OF COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY
A. Alleged Counterexample That Purports to Show a Perverse
Competitive Advantage to High Cost Utilities
Hypothetical examples such as in Table 1 have been offered in the
debate over recovery of stranded costs. The example purportedly shows
that customers have a perverse incentive to choose high cost utilities in a
regime of stranded cost recovery. In reviewing this alleged counterexample,
we will look only at the effect of the stranded cost recovery mechanism,
bifurcated from the rest of the access pricing procedure.31 That is to say, the
only issue is how to recover stranded costs of generating assets, apart from
the method of pricing access generally or recovering all other costs of
service.
The example assumes that each incumbent utility will recover its
stranded costs under the "revenues lost" method. According to the
example, a customer of the purportedly high cost Utility B would have to
pay 2.2t in fixed and stranded costs and 2.1t of marginal energy costs to
switch to purportedly low cost Utility A, or (2.2+2.1=) 4.3t. This is more
than the 4.2t he already pays. Superficially, the "high cost" Utility B would

30. Because of explicit termination dates in some wholesale contracts, versus
unspecified (open-ended) obligations to serve at retail, FERC may estimate and award to a
wholesale electric company a different amount for stranded costs than a state regulatory
commission might authorize. Our analysis ignores this difference in estimation method and
concentrates on recovery mechanisms instead.
31. Note in the discussion above that we are not necessarily assuming that the stranded
cost recovery will be billed separately from other charges. The recovery might well be added
to charges for transmission access to competing firms. Or, as discussed below, it might be
assessed to all customers or to only departing customers. This bifurcation assumption lets
us examine the consequences of the stranded cost recovery mechanism for competition on
equal terms independent of the access mechanism.
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appear to gain an alleged advantage over A from being able to assign its
fixed costs as an exit fee. But a customer switching from A to B would pay
(1.5+2.0=) 3.5t, or less than the 3.6c he already pays. This seemingly
perverse result allegedly demonstrates that stranded cost recovery creates
an uneconomic competitive advantage to high cost utilities.

AllegedCouterexample WhihPurportedly: Shows Pervete
2Cometitive Advantage toigh Cost tilities_

Ujtility As
Service
Te...
rritory

(v/~h

__________________(ckWh)'

1. Marginal Cost of Energy (Prior
Regulatory Regime)
2. Fixed Operating Cost (Prior
Regulatory Regime)
3. Total Customer Charge (Prior
Regulatory Regime)

Utility Bs
Service
Territory

2.1

2.0

1.5

2.2

3.6

4.2

Note that the example assumes that Utility A has the highest
incremental cost but lowest total costs?' It also unrealistically assumes that
all fixed costs are sunk in the prior regime and that all sunk costs are
stranded. (Below, we explore the consequences of changed assumptions.
We first address the correctness of the conclusions given these particular
assumptions.) The hypothetical does not use conventional utility accounting
for generation costs, but we will follow it anyway because it allows us to
prove all of our points about weak and strong neutrality in the context of a
simple numerical illustration.
B. The Alleged Counterexample Actually Illustrates Competitive Parity
We have not concocted this example as a "straw man" to allow
ready refutation. To the contrary, based on this and similar examples, critics
conclude that stranded cost recovery (1) provides a barrier to entry to
efficient alternative suppliers and (2) discriminatorily favors incumbents.
Ironically, these conclusions are wrong on the face of the alleged
counterexample. These conclusions are based on the assumption that the
32. In the spirit of this alleged counterexample we are assuming that Utility B is in fact
the high total cost seller (from an imbedded cost basis). More realistically Utility A might be
a gas-fired utility with higher energy costs but lower fixed costs than Utility B, which might
be a coal-fired utility where the reverse is true.
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designation of the most efficient provider should be based on total costs,
including stranded fixed costs. But, by definition, these costs are fixed
regardless of which supplier competes successfully to get the business.
Assume, as does the hypothetical, that all costs of generation but energy are
fixed regardless of which supplier is chosen. Looking then at the marginal
costs of energy, Utility B (not Utility A, as claimed by the counterexample)
is indeed the low cost provider. If static economic efficiency is the goal, the
A customer really should switch to B, and the B customer should not
switch.' After all, such "economy" transactions are undertaken based on
differences in true marginal costs every day in the utility industry,
irrespective of fixed costs.' Thus on its face, the counterexample illustrates
that there is no perverse incentive for customers to choose high marginal
cost producers, if we are looking at the true relative efficiency of the two
utilities going forward. In fact, insofar as we can determine from the facts,
all seven of the above goals would be accomplished, even if the example
were realistic.
Indeed, it is easy to show a simple example of a recovery
mechanism that pays for the stranded costs in Table 1 while leaving any
true relative efficiencies of two competitors going forward intact. Suppose
a third party agrees to amortize Utility A's sunk costs in exchange for the
right to charge all competitors who serve customers 1.5€ in Utility A's
service territory and similarly for 2.2¢ in Utility B's service territory.m
Utility A's incremental costs in its own service territory are
(2.1+1.5=) 3.6o and Utility B's are (2.0+1.5=) 3.50 in Utility A's service
territory. The respective incremental costs in Utility B's service territory are
now (2.1+2.2=) 4.30 for Utility A and (2.0+2.2=) 4.2¢ for Utility B. Precisely
because the stranded cost recovery mechanism funded only the legacy of
previously sunk costs with competitively neutral per unit charges on all
competitors and left marginal energy cost differences intact, it satisfies both
weak and strong competitive neutrality.

33. This should be intuitively obvious. Fixed costs are indeed fixed, regardless of
customer choice of supplier, so their total amount and their distribution among suppliers can
have no effect on total industry costs. Every kWh in Utility A's service territory that switches
to Utility B will generate (2.1-2.0=-) 0.1t in true efficiency gains. Conversely, switches in the
opposite direction will generate efficiency losses.
34. One way to think of the effect of opening up access to competition is to strengthen
the incentives to bring in lower cost generating resources. The efficiency gains from
competition in the proffered counterexample exist only because there is an assumed obstacle
to an economy transaction between Utility A and Utility B in the prior regulatory regime.
Alternatively, the counterexample might be interpreted to claim that competition under
stranded cost recovery would obstruct the economy transactions that occurred in the prior
regulatory regime from occurring in the transition, leading to efficiency losses.
35. We show below that the consequences for competitive neutrality are no different for
this recovery mechanism as for the "revenues lost" method.
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Some readers will accept this rather simple result, yet with such
profound consequences, as an obvious property of a successful stranded cost
recovery mechanism. They need read no further. The weak form of competitive neutrality will almost always be accomplished in a regime of any
amount of stranded cost recovery, because the incremental costs of both
entrants and incumbents will always be raised by the same amount-the
stranded access charge.N Nevertheless, it is instructive to work through
alternative scenarios to see how this result is necessarily achieved even in
situations where the result is not so obvious. Before doing so, it is instructive
to raise the "fairness" question in connection with Utility A's competitive
plightC. "Fair Competition"
Let us return to Table 1 to address the fairness as well as the
efficiency of the outcome of competition. Examples such as the one in Table
1 have been offered by utilities such as Utility A to demonstrate that they
would allegedly be ill-treated by the stranded cost transition mechanism.
Formerly viewed as efficient in a regime of regulation, they fear that their
relatively high marginal costs will make it difficult to compete, yet their
relatively low fixed cost advantage will be of no avail because it will be offset
by Utility B's stranded cost recovery mechanism. Is this fair competition?
At the most superficial level, the answer to fairness concerns is that
the relevant standard of static economic efficiency as a measure of market
performance can be found in any introductory economics text. Such an
outcome (lowest marginal cost supplier gets the business in a winner take all
competition irrespective of fixed costs) is exactly what ought to happen today
under current dispatch and what ought to happen under effective
competition, with or without stranded cost recovery. At a deeper level,
however, the concern over fairness can also employ the distinction between
strong and weak competitive neutrality-indeed, it illustrates how powerful
this distinction can be in clarifying the issues.
First, it is important to note that the fairness concern appears to
accept our most important result, the fact that any amount or method of
collecting stranded costs achieves weak competitive neutrality-mindeed, the

36. Some observers have noted that this gap between marginal costs and price is a
potential source of inefficiency. See Alfred E.Kahn, Can Regulation and Competition Exist?
Solutions to the Stranded Cost Problem and Other Conundra, ELECrRIcrrY J., Oct. 1994, at
23-35. It is certainly true that some stranded cost recovery mechanisms may distort decisions
about the consumption of electricity versus other goods and services in the economy, that
is, they may alter demand in a second-best fashion. These issues would have to be addressed
as part of overall rate design, an issue that goes beyond the scope of this article. Our current
concern is solely with competitive neutrality in the market for the supply of electricity.
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revised basis for complaint is that stranded cost recovery ignores fairness and
does too good a job of achieving static economic efficiency! This, of course,
turns the current debate over economic efficiency on its head.
The real source of Utility A's problem is not stranded cost recovery,
but that the rules of the game have changed in the transition to deregulation.
In a benchmark competition between the two utilities under regulation, Utility
A looks like the winner, because it has the lowest average cost. But in a
competitive market, the relevant measure of static economic efficiency is
incremental cost. Utility A has wrongly attributed its newly conferred
competitive disadvantage to recovery of stranded costs. But the real source of
Utility A's problem is a switch from regulatory rewards to efficiency (based
on lowest average cost) to market-based rewards for efficiency (based on
weak competitive neutrality).
Virtually any level of stranded cost recovery notwithstanding (from
all to nothing), the "robustness" property of weak competitive neutrality is
what causes Utility A's inability to serve its former retail customers at a profit
It will be almost impossible to keep Utility A's generators turned on in a
competitive generation market with Utility B's lower marginal cost resources
standing idle, Utility A's lower fixed costs notwithstanding. Any profitable
offer Utility A makes for business will always be profitably undercut by
Utility B. Utility A's lament arises not from stranded cost recovery, but from
the fact that the property of robustness will make it virtually impossible to
purge almost any competitive access scheme of weak competitive neutrality.
Of course, we could prohibit competition by Utility B, but that would
undercut the whole point of a transition to competition and the expected
efficiency gains from competition.
Even if we could do so, fairness to utilities with low fixed costs is no
reason to give up weak competitive neutrality. Utility A's lament arises from
the fact that it wrongly views stranded cost recovery as the cause of the
problem when, in fact, stranded cost recovery is the answer. Utility A's
fairness concerns are simply another argument for strong competitive
neutrality, not a reason to impose static economic inefficiency on the
competitive regime. Utility A is in no way "disadvantaged" in our example
because it recovers its 1.5t as a stranded cost recovery from its customers.
Utility A would be harmed by a violation of strong competitive neutrality in
our example, not weak competitive neutrality. Under recovery of all stranded
costs, Utility A avoids all its marginal costs and recovers all its fixed costs in
the stranded cost charge, while giving its former customers the benefits of
lower cost power-what could be fairer?
D. Examination of a More Realistic Example
The above example assumes that all fixed costs of both utilities are
stranded. This may be unrealistic because the FERC's "revenues lost" method
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requires that the competitive revenues be netted out of the actual regulatory
cost of service to determine the true stranded costs. Nevertheless, let us
initially assume that all sunk costs are stranded to capture the spirit of the
hypothetical. We return later to the more general case where wholesale prices
and mitigation will permit some, but not all, recovery of sunk costs.
To undertake a more comprehensive examination of the claims that
stranded cost recovery is anticompetitive, we expand on the example
presented in Table 1. For the purpose of the argument (and to keep the
example simple), we do not differentiate between wholesale and retail
markets,F avoid issues of federal and state jurisdiction, assume (for now) that
stranded costs can be measured accurately," and assume that stranded cost
recovery is non-bypassable.' Consistent with the spirit of the example in
Table 1, a number of other assumptions are implicit.) Some of these
37. The example simply ignores charges for services such as for transmission,
distribution, and customer service. Recovery of costs other than generation costs are
assumed to be handled outside the framework of this example by a separate charge to
customers (or at least are computed under a separate mechanism). It is assumed that all
stranded costs are incurred in the generation part of the industry.
38. That is, we assume initially that we can accurately estimate what the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission calls the "legitimate and prudent obligations the utility undertook,"
and that the stranded cost estimate is what the Appeals Court for the D.C. Circuit in Cajun
describes as "legitimate, verifiable, and accurately calculated." See supra note 24. For
simplicity, we also assume initially that the stranded cost recovery mechanism is established
at a fixed level ex ante for some period of time (maybe the entire transition period) without
any "true up."
39. To simplify, the examples assume that only one regulatory agency will be setting
the level of the stranded recovery charge and, initially, that the stranded cost charge is
assessed by the incumbent utility directly on sales of new entrants-rather than in the form
of an "exit fee" (we show below that this assumption does not affect the competitive
neutrality of a successful levy). It is also assumed that ratepayers cannot migrate to other
service territories to evade the recovery of the stranded cost recovery charge. Obviously, if
stranded costs cannot be collected from some customers, stranded cost charges may have a
potential asymmetric effect on competitors. It thus is assumed, for the purpose of the
argument, that the stranded cost recovery mechanism cannot be bypassed. (For a discussion
of potential bypass strategies, see Bernard Black, A Proposal for Supplementing Retail
Competition in the Electricity Industry, ELECrRICrrY J., Oct. 1994, at 58-72.) It is also assumed
that all customers go "cold turkey" to the new competitive regime so that no incumbents
have residual obligations to serve that create separate regulatory treatment for different
classes of customers.
40. For example, stranded cost recovery aside, it is assumed that the incumbent utility
has published an open access tariff which offers terms and conditions to entrants equivalent
to that available to the incumbent (leaving price as the only difference in the service
offerings). It is also assumed that (1) regulators have already determined that incumbent
firms should be allowed to recover transition costs; and (2) incumbents will actually be able
to recover allowed stranded costs (that is, there are no legal or economic obstacles to
recovery).
To avoid the need to differentiate marginal costs from average variable costs, it is
assumed that the two utilities operate only one generating plant for which marginal costs
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simplifying assumptions, of course, will not be valid in every real-world
situation. For now, we simply seek to move beyond potential complications
to examine the consequences of stranded cost recovery for competition on
equal terms. We will, however, relax a number of assumptions to examine the
consequences on our conclusions.
Table 2 continues to assume that all fixed costs of existing generation
are sunk in the prior regulatory regime.41 To keep all sunk costs stranded, the
market price of power is assumed to be only 2.0¢/kWh (see line 4) and equal
to Utility B's marginal costs of power. This may be the case if the value of
capacity is close to zero because of very significant amounts of excess
(stranded) capacity.
Marginal costs are avoidable by definition and, thus, cannot be
stranded. As a result, the two utilities' stranded costs are also equal to their
sunk costs.' Row 5 calculates stranded costs (that is, the fixed cost liability
over what can be expected to be recovered in a regime of competition)
formally as the revenue requirements of the prior regulatory regime net of
avoided costs and/or mitigation benefits. 3 In this example, Utility B can

are the same as average variable costs (up to a capacity limit). The example also assumes that
both utilities are selling undifferentiated service in the service territory of the prior
regulatory regime (there are no "non-jurisdictional sales"), and that all other competitive
advantages not relating to costs are nonexistent or are accounted for in other terms of access
such as a separate methodology for transmission pricing. This means that the only possible
efficiency gains in the transition arise from savings in marginal energy costs (more general
cases are examined below).
Finally, it is assumed that the firms' costs are known and the competitive price is
clearly established. A competitive power market has developed with buyers and sellers all

acting as price takers and all maximizing profits, given the regulatory rules of the transition.
41. To keep with the spirit of the example in Table 1, we are assuming initially that all
fixed costs that do not vary with output are sunk (non-variable over time) and cannot be
avoided by reducing generation or mitigated in any other way. This assumption is relaxed
below. (Also note changes in terminology as compared with Table 1 to reflect our
assumptions more accurately.)
42. Readers will note that our assumption that market prices equaled Utility B's
marginal energy costs made the calculation of the appropriate stranded cost recovery
obvious-equal to average sunk costs of each utility in the prior regulatory regime. In the
more general case, Utility B will be selling power in wholesale markets at prices in excess
of marginal costs, thereby partly mitigating the stranded costs. Such revenues would have
to be taken into account in calculating the appropriate stranded cost recovery amount. This
more general case is considered below.
43. The general approach used to compute stranded costs in this example is consistent
with the formula recommended by the Edison Electric Institute in its comments to the FERC:
SC = R(b) - AVC-MB-DR;
where R(b) is the bundled revenue expectation under a continuation of the old regulatory
regime, AVC is the avoided variable cost, MB is mitigation benefits (including net revenues
from the freed up capacity and other net cost savings from buyouts, buy-downs, etc.), and
DR (delivery, that is, transmission and distribution, revenues assumed in these examples to
be zero).

Winter 19971

THE ECONOMICS OF NEGATIVE BARRIERS

mitigate the revenue loss from defecting customers by selling into the market
for 2.0t. And Utility A, with marginal generating costs in excess of the market
price for power, mitigates revenue losses by avoiding marginal production
costs of 2.1€ for every MWh lost demand.
TJable 2
The Example Actually Illustrates
Competitive Neutrality of Stranded Cost R

e.-

.Utilit 'WsUtilit A's
Servce ervce"
1. Marginal Generating Costs (Prior
Regulatory Regime)
2. Sunk Generating Cost (Prior Regulatory
Regime)*
3. Total Customer Charge (Prior
Regulatory Regime)
4. Market Price of Power
5. Calculation of Stranded Costs:
Revenues in prior regulatory regime
- Avoided costs
- Mitigation benefits (mkt. sales)
= Stranded Costs
Full Incremental Cost of Service (during
transition):**
6. Utility A

2.1

2.0

1.5

2.2

3.6
2.0

4.2
2.0

3.6
-2.1
-0.0
1.5

4.2
-0.0
-2.0
2.2

2.1 +1.5---3.6

2.1+2.2=-4.3

2.0+2.2=4.2
2.0+1.5=3.5
7. Utility B
4.2
3.5
8. Customer Price of Power
9. Price Required for Full Cost Recovery
4.2
3.5
for Efficient Provider in the Transition
* Sunk costs are calculated on the basis of load served in the respective service
territories in the prior regulatory regime.
** The example ignores charges such as for transmission, distribution, and
customer service.
Under these assumptions, Utility A will compute a stranded cost
charge of 1.5t, and Utility B will set a stranded cost charge equal to 2.2t. As
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a result, Utility A has a "full" incremental cost" of service of (2.1+2.2=) 4.3t
in Utility B's service territory. 0s It might appear initially that, as a result of
the 2.2t stranded cost recovery charge, Utility B has an artificial competitive
advantage of 2.30 (4.3-2.0) in its own service territory. But this is incorrect:
0.1€ of that figure is Utility B's marginal cost advantage, and the other 2.2t
is exactly offset by Utility B's legacy of stranded cost from the prior
regulatory regime. The example shows that this 2.2t charge is imputed to
Utility B's incremental costs in its own service territory, so that the cost
advantage remains at 0.1t despite the stranded cost recovery mechanism.
It is clear that the stranded cost recovery fees exactly offset the
utilities' liability for paying stranded costs. However, it may not be
immediately obvious that, irrespective of the collection mechanism, the
stranded cost charges become an imputed cost to utilities in their own
service territory which they impute to their own costs. In fact, as a result of
a 1.5t stranded cost change in Utility A's service territory, the full
incremental cost of service of Utility A during the transition is 3.6t to
provide service in its own service territory-compared to 4.3t in Utility B's
service territory. The full incremental cost of service of Utility B's during the
transition are 3.5t in Utility A's service territory and 4.2¢ in its own service
territory.
The concept that stranded cost charges become imputed costs to
each utility is critical to the entire discussion that follows. Once this
fundamental point is understood, all of the following examples make the
basic point: weak competitive neutrality (undisturbed competitive
advantages going forward for non-stranded costs) will be achieved by
virtually any successful stranded cost recovery mechanism because the
incumbent will impute to its full incremental cost of service an equivalent
stranded cost charge, no matter how complete or incomplete that allowance
may be. Any pre-existing competitive advantages or disadvantages due to
true efficiency differences will therefore remain undisturbed by the
stranded cost recovery allowance.
Utility B will impute 2.2t in stranded cost to the costs of service in
its own service territory during the transition. It will do so even if there is

44. We use the term "full" incremental cost to represent the sum of marginal cost (the
real non-sunk resource cost, sometimes called the "direct" incremental cost) plus the
allowance for recovery of the stranded costs. See William J.Baumol & Robert D. Willig, Brief

of Evidence: Economic Principlesfor Evaluation of the Issues Raised by Clear CommunicationsLtd.
on Interconnectionwith Telecom Corporationof New Zealand Ltd. (Apr. 28,1992) at 25 (available
upon request from the authors).
45. The essence of the complaint about competitive disadvantage in Utility B's service
territory is this purported 'artificial' 2.2t incremental cost disadvantage. But it is precisely
this wedge that is required to force up prices by the amounts necessary to amortize stranded
costs.
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no explicit regulatory mechanism to require that all suppliers, including the
incumbent, pay the stranded cost recovery charge. The reason is that if
Utility B provides the service to its customers it can no longer collect a 2.2¢
(or whatever allowed) charge from Utility A. 4 If Utility B charged to its
own customers less than its marginal generating costs plus the stranded cost
allowance of 2.2c, the utility would collect less revenue and profits than if
the customer were supplied by Utility A. Thus, a utility's own stranded cost
charge is a real imputed cost to itsel. The utility will realize that it does not
make sense to cut prices down to its own marginal generating costs of
energy to retain business because it will be competing against its own
stranded cost recovery mechanism. As a result, weak competitive neutrality
is preserved even if the utility is not explicitly forced to recover stranded
costs from its own customers. Utility B retains only its previous 0.1t
marginal cost advantage in its service territory despite the recovery of
stranded costs of 2.2t from Utility A. (The competitive consequences of this
imputation are even more interesting in the example below where Utility
B is undisputedly the higher cost seller.)
Let us examine the Court's concerns about anticompetitive
consequences in Cajun in the context of Table 2. The Court's concern was
that stranded cost recovery represents an "odd asymmetry." The example
in Table 2 illustrates clearly the principle of competitive neutrality in
recovering stranded costs.
First, comparing line 6 with line 7, we see that Utility B, the most
efficient competitor in terms of marginal costs, retains this advantage in
both service territories despite the recovery of an unequal stranded cost
charge in both service territories. Utility B's stranded cost charge leaves
unchanged Utility B's marginal energy cost advantage in its own territory
and does not affect the relative cost of service in Utility A's service territory.
Utility B always retains its 0.1€ marginal cost advantage. Stranded cost
recovery in Table 2 accomplishes weak competitive neutrality and does in
no way change the way (or intensity) in which the two utilities compete.
The competitive advantage during the transition period (that is, until
stranded costs are amortized) will be no different from the advantage after
the transition period, all else equal.
Second, it is simply untrue that the stranded cost recovery
mechanism somehow protects Utility B from the rigors of competition in its
own service territory while giving it an unfair competitive advantage in
searching for customers in other service territories. Utility B's competitive
46. William J. Baumol & J.Gregory Sidak, The Pricingof Inputs Sold to Competitors, 11
YALE J. ON REG. 171, 198 (1994), appear to have uncovered this property of the imputation

principle. Note, however, that it will happen only if there is a competitive market for power
in our example, so that incumbents have no incentive to discount the recovery fee on their
own sales.
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advantage in both service territories arises from its lower marginal costs,
not its stranded cost recovery mechanism (see lines 5 and 6). In fact, Utility
A will be priced out of the generating market in both service territories by
its high marginal costs regardless of its stranded cost recovery mechanism
(it cannot profitably sell into a 2.0o power market, even to serve its own
customers).
Utility A is priced out of the generation market, not by Utility B's
stranded cost recovery mechanism, but because its marginal generating
costs (2.1o) exceed the market price of power (2.0t). But this is also true in
Utility A's own service territory, despite the recovery of the 1.5t stranded
cost recovery fee. This is exactly what should happen if Utility A is to
receive the correct market signals to cut back its generation in favor of
power wheeled in from Utility B. This efficiency gain flows directly through
to customers.
Note also that the stranded cost recovery mechanism does not
provide relief from the rigors of competition in either service territory
during the transition period in so far as non-stranded costs are concerned.
We can see that by observing that the market price of electricity is 2.0¢ in
both service territories. There is no guarantee that either utility will recover
its non-stranded costs during the period in which the recovery mechanism
is in place. The only protection is that competition will occur unabated
within the constraint that rates will not be allowed to fall to levels that
prevent recovery of efficient marginal generating costs plus stranded cost,
in either service territory.
The strong dimension of competitive neutrality (an equal
opportunity to expect to earn the cost of capital) is illustrated by comparing
lines 4 and 8. Both utilities face the same 2.0t market price (line 4)
regardless of where the customer is located and regardless of differences in
stranded cost recovery. Customers in Utility A's service territory will pay
3.5c during the transition and those in Utility B's service territory will pay
4.2t. The difference is exactly equal to the difference in the two stranded
cost fees of 0.7t. After the transition is complete, customers in both service
territories will pay the same market price for power (after Utility A has
adopted Utility B's efficiency advantage in marginal generating costs or
wheeled in Utility B's lower cost power, and Utilities A and B have
amortized their stranded costs).
Note that customer prices in Utility A's service territory fall by the
0.1t benefit of entry by Utility B, and all true efficiency gains from
competition are flowed through to customers. However, this does not create
any additional stranded costs. The price decline was brought about by a
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true efficiency gain from Utility B's entry.47 There is no price reduction in
Utility B's service territory because it is already the most efficient provider
of power there." By the same token, customers in each service territory pay
only for the costs stranded in their service territory and are in no way
burdened by the recovery of stranded costs outside their service territory.
Before leaving this example, it is noteworthy that it provides several
other important by-product insights through the particular choice of
numbers. First, Utility B requires a stranded cost charge even though there
are likely to be no departing customers. Since Utility B is the most efficient
marginal cost provider, power should be flowing from Utility B to Utility
A and not the reverse. It is merely the threat of charging the 2.20 in stranded
costs to suppliers of departing customers that permits Utility B to recover
the regulatory costs of service (4.2t) from the customers who remain
(through the imputed 2.2t charge). No customers of Utility B should pay an
"exit charge" if markets are working effectively to achieve short-run
economic efficiency.
Indeed, it will be Utility A's customers that will depart the system
if competitive markets work effectively. Even though Utility A has the
lowest total costs, either it or its customers will be motivated to wheel in
power from Utility B at the 2.O market price to achieve short-run
economies. Utility A will require a 1.5t stranded cost fee even though it has
the lowest fixed and total costs (after market purchases). One therefore
should not be confused into believing Utility A does not need stranded cost
recovery, or that it is protected from stranded cost exposure because it has
the lowest average costs.
To capture the Court's concerns about a potential "odd
asymmetry," let us consider a case where one believes Utility A does not
require stranded cost recovery because it has the lowest rates in the region
(that is, 3.6¢ for Utility A versus 4.2t for Utility B). As a result of this belief,
one claims Utility A to be competitively disadvantaged by Utility B's
stranded cost recovery mechanism. (We make this initial assumption in
order to accentuate a rather surprising result regarding which utilities will
actually be requiring a stranded cost recovery mechanism.) Note first that
Utility A's 0.1t marginal generating cost disadvantage is not sunk in the
prior regime and therefore is not stranded.
If Utility A wheels in Utility B's power at a price of 2.0t, it can resell
it to its customers at 3.5¢ and shut down its own generation. Some may

47. The example assumes that Utility B's 0.7c fixed cost disadvantage is a regulatory
legacy that cannot be corrected, but that Utility A's 0.1t marginal cost disadvantage can be
mitigated, either through matching Utility B's efficiencies or by wheeling in Utility B's
power.
48. Of course, in the more general case, its customers could be receiving benefits of
lower prices from efficiency gains from sources other than energy savings.
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wrongly believe that Utility A has no need for a stranded cost recovery
mechanism because it is the lowest average cost producer. However, this
will not be a competitive equilibrium. If Utility A can buy 2.0¢ power from
Utility B, so can its customers in an open access regime with zero Utility A
stranded cost charges. Utility A will thus be unable to charge 3.5t without
a 1.5t stranded cost recovery mechanism.
These important insights should be carefully considered by some
of the critics of stranded cost recovery. True relative efficiency differences
in a regime of competition should be based on marginal costs going
forward, not sunk costs. The example illustrates that one would be wrong
in claiming that Utility A required no stranded cost recovery mechanism
and wrong in claiming that it would be competitively disadvantaged by
Utility B's stranded cost recovery mechanism. What disadvantages Utility
A is its own relatively high (compared to the market price) marginal
generating costs.
Likewise, one would be wrong in believing that Utility B's low
marginal generating costs conferred a competitive advantage in wholesale
markets that obviate the need for stranded cost recovery. A low market
price of power could prevent even the most efficient utilities from
recovering total costs. One would also be wrong in believing that Utility A's
stranded cost recovery prevented Utility B from fully realizing the
competitive benefits of that efficiency advantage.
E. Example of Stranded Cost Recovery Where
One Utility Is The Undisputed Low Cost Provider
Table 3 provides an example where Utility A is clearly the
undisputed low cost provider. The assumptions are the same as before, but
Utility A's marginal generating cost is 1.9€ instead of 2.1t. Again, the
market price for power, 1.9t in this case, is assumed to be the marginal
generating cost of the most efficient producer. The overall results for
efficiency are the same, although there is no "anomaly" where power flows
from a territory where a stranded cost recovery mechanism is levied. There
will be a level playing field because there is no barrier to entry to efficient
suppliers in either market (territory), and no discrimination in favor of
incumbents.
Even with stranded cost recovery, Utility A retains its cost
advantage in its own service territory (compare rows 5 and 6 of column 1).
Utility B gains no artificial competitive advantage from its recovery
mechanism when competing either inside or outside its service territory.
Costs and prices in Utility A's service territory should be completely
unaffected by Utility B's stranded cost recovery mechanism.
Utility B also has a 0.1t cost disadvantage in its own service
territory, despite the stranded cost recovery mechanism. Both firms sell into
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the same competitive power market at the same prices and recover their
total costs. Therefore, the transition cost recovery mechanism is strongly
competitively neutral. The customer prices in Utility B's service territory
during the transition (line 8) exceed those in Utility A's service territory by
exactly the amount of the differences in the stranded cost charge. Prices in
equilibrium after the transition will converge to the same market level.
Table 3 seemingly provides one of the clearest examples of a claim
that the stranded cost recovery charge could represent a barrier to entry for
more efficient alternative suppliers and discriminate in favor of incumbents,
because it dramatically raises the price of services delivered by A into B.
However, these claims forget the fact that Utility B will impute to its own
sales the 2.2¢ of lost recovery of stranded costs, even if the regulatory
recovery mechanism charges stranded costs explicitly only to departing
customers who switch to A. Utility A thus retains the same 0.1t marginal
cost advantage in both service territories regardless of the recovery of
stranded costs in both territories. Put another way, Utility B is priced out of
the market by its higher marginal costs, with or without recovery of
stranded fixed costs.
F. Example of Stranded Cost Recovery
with Capacity Rents and Mitigation of Costs
Table 4 illustrates that these conclusions do not change in any
significant way if the problem involves multiple firms with numerous
service territories and a market price that strands some but not all fixed
costs (that is, where the value of capacity increases market prices of power
above marginal costs). This table also affords the opportunity to add more
complexity to the example, particularly the need to account for the fact that
not all fixed costs will be sunk and that mitigation of stranded costs via
buyouts or buydowns of existing commitments (or the cancellation of
planned commitments) can reduce total exposure.
Our previous examples assumed that each utility recovered
stranded costs in its own service territory. This assumption was made to
address the purported example of a perverse result under stranded cost
recovery and to deal with the "odd asymmetry" claim. This does not
address specifically the possibility of an unfair competitive disadvantage to
a completely new entrant (that is, one with no service territory).
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"Table3
m Whe.

Stranded Cost'Recovery

ro
i
nMe Utility is the Unispted Low Cost
"

" "

r

r' "

_________________________

,

Utifity: A'%

tiiy '

Service •
Service
Territory .. Territory :

(/kWh),

jt/kWh):

1. Marginal Generating Cost (Prior

Regulatory Regime)
2. Sunk Generating Cost (Prior
Regulatory Regime)*
3. Total Customer Charge (Prior
Regulatory Regime)
4. Market Price of Power
5. Calculation of Stranded Costs:
Revenues in prior regulatory regime
- Avoided costs
- Mitigation benefits (mkt. sales)
= Stranded Costs
Full Incremental Cost of Service
(during transition):**
6. Utility A
7. Utility B

1.9

2.0

1.5

2.2

3.4
1.9

4.2
1.9

3.4
- 0.0
- 1.9

T3

4.2
-2.0
- 0.0
2.2

1.9+1.5=
3.4
2.0+1.5=
3.5
3.4

1.9+2.2=
4.1
2.0+2.2=
4.2
4.1

8. Cutomer Price of Power
9. Price Required for Full Cost Recovery
3.4
4.1
for Efficient Provider in the Transition
* Sunk costs are calculated on the basis of load served in the
respective service territories in the prior regulatory regime.
**The example ignores charges such as for transmission, distribution,
and customer service.
Utility C in Table 4 is designed to deal with just such a case. It may
be viewed as either an incumbent with a service territory but no stranded
costs, or a completely new entrant with no service territory in which to
recover stranded costs. Both cases are conceptually equivalent.
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Table 4':
Stranded Cost Recovery Mechanism
With Capacity Rents'and Miigation of Csts::

Utility A'sI
Serce
:"Territory
1. Marginal Cost of Power
(Prior Regulatory Regime)
2. Fixed Generating Cost
(Prior Regulatory
Regime)*
3. Total Customer Charge
(Prior Regulatory Regime)
4. Market Price of Power
5. Calculation of Stranded
Costs:
Revenues in prior
regulatory regime
- Avoided costs
- Mitigation benefits (mkt.
sales)
- Mitigation benefits
(contract reneg.)
= Stranded Costs
Full Incremental Cost of
Service (during
transition):**
6. Utility A
7. Utility B
8. Utility C

Ut

.
B's
Bt

ervic

_,"_:

UtilityCs
'Servicie,

..Territory.:..

Territory

1.9

2.0

1.9

1.5

2.2

1.0

3.4
2.2

4.2
2.2

2.9
2.2

3.4

4.2

2.9

- 0.0
-2.2

- 0.0
-2.2

- 0.0
-2.2

- 0.7
-0.5

- 1.0

- 0.7

1.0

0.0

1.9+0.5=
2.4
2.0+0.5=
2.5
1.9+0.5=
2.4
2.2+0.5=
2.7

1.9+1.0=
2.9
2.0+1.0=
3.0
1.9+1.0=
2.9
2.2+1.0=
3.2

1.9
2.0
19

9. Customer Price of
2.2
Power
10. Price Required for Full
Cost Recovery for
Efficient Provider in the
Transition
2.7
3.2
2.2
* Sunk costs are calculated on the basis of load served in the
respective service territories in the prior regulatory regime.
** The example ignores charges such as for transmission,
distribution, and customer service.
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The example assumes that the market price is 2.2t (see line 4). All
three firms benefit from selling into the marketplace (assumed here to be a
large one where all firms are price takers and find it profitable to generate
up to a capacity limit, where marginal energy costs of each firm then exceed
2.2¢).
As with the hypothetical, and consistent with our definition of
stranded costs as arising only from costs sunk in the prior regulatory
scheme, 9 we start the calculation of stranded costs with revenue requirements under the prior regulatory regime and net out any avoidable costs
and mitigation benefits (line 5). Because each utility's marginal generating
costs are well below the market price for power, each utility can offset
revenue losses from departing customers with 2.2¢ of market revenues from
the sale of power that would have been consumed by defecting customers.
As a result of continued generation (and the fact that these examples do not
account for charges such as for transmission, distribution, or customer
service), no costs are avoided.
Calculation of stranded costs is somewhat more complicated in this
example because we also account for the benefits of buyouts or buydowns
of existing commitments (or the cancellation of planned commitments). We
assume that Utilities A, B, and C in Table 4 are able to save 0.7¢, 1.0€, and
0.7¢, respectively, by renegotiating some of their fixed fuel or purchased
power contracts. These cost savings would have benefited defecting
customers had they stayed and created a reduction in unrecovered revenue
requirements. Thus, they must be netted from stranded costs. Consumers
in each service territory receive the respective benefits of mitigation, and
rates during the transition are uniformly below where they would have
been otherwise. It is interesting that there are no stranded cost recovery
charges in Utility C's service territory because the 0.7t savings from
contract renegotiations mitigated the "out of market" cost.
Note again how competitive neutrality is retained. All three utilities
face the exact same market price of power (2.2€). Customer prices in each
service territory exceed this level by exactly the amount of the stranded cost
recovery mechanism (line 9). At these prices, each utility will be motivated
to sell up to its capacity limit. Despite the differing levels of the recovery
mechanism (line 5), each utility once again retains whatever marginal cost
advantages it may have in all three service territories (lines 6-8). Note
especially that Utility B's 0.1€ marginal cost disadvantage is maintained,
despite its full stranded cost recovery. In particular, it retains the 0.1e cost
disadvantage even in its own service territory.

49. Note that the costs obligation may occur in the past regime and create negative cash
flow in the transition regime, yet still qualify as a stranded cost.
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Unlike our previous example, however, there is no efficiency gain
from cutting back Utility B's generation in favor of other lower cost sources.
At a 2.2t wholesale price, Utility B will still be motivated to use its own
generation despite its higher marginal generating cost. If the 0.1€ difference
in marginal costs is a true efficiency difference, the extent to which
customers could get the benefits of improvements in efficiency by
eliminating this inefficiency depends on the assumptions about incentives
to mitigate and the mechanics of the regulatory scheme in the transition.
The calculation of stranded costs in Table 4 assumed that the 0.1€ marginal
cost disadvantage of Utility B cannot be mitigated. If it were possible for the
utility to eliminate the discrepancy by adopting some efficiency measure
that reduced its marginal costs to 1.9€, and regulators wished to account for
this mitigation, Utility B's stranded costs in line 5 would be 0.9t and the
retail price would drop further to 3.1OD This example points to the fact that,
at least in principal, future expected efficiency gains can be accounted for
as mitigation of stranded costs-provided we are confident of their
magnitude.
In reality, of course, regulators may have insufficient information
as to whether the 0.1t difference represents an inefficiency that could be
corrected or simply the fact that the proportions of fixed and variable costs
may differ between plants. Put another way, it will not be so easy to
actually calculate stranded costs once mitigation strategies and uncertainty
must be taken into account. Detailed industry scrutiny of mitigation efforts
could prove onerous. On the other hand, as we discuss more fully below,
the solution to these dilemmas may be to create incentives for mitigation
during the transition and to occasionally "true up" or reset the stranded
cost recovery during the transition to account for costs that are truly not
sunk, thereby ensuring that utility customers share in the unknown future
efficiency gains.

50. If Utility B's high marginal energy costs are tardy and inefficient, permitting a 1.0€
stranded cost recovery charge will permit Utility B to pass on that inefficiency, in the sense
that its customers will pay higher prices than necessary (thus violating objective No. 5). At
the 1.0€ stranded cost fee, Utility B could realize a 0.1t benefit by eliminating the
inefficiency. However, despite the potential of 0.1t higher profits, weak competitive
neutrality still holds, despite the erroneous calculation of the true level of stranded costs.
Once again, this points to the conclusion that the real issue will be correct calculation of
stranded costs, not weak competitive neutrality.
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III. APPLICATION OF RESULTS TO ISSUES IN THE
CURRENT DEBATE
A. Functional Equivalence of the Formal Recovery
Methods for Competitive Neutrality under Our Assumptions
Our examples to this point have assumed that the stranded cost
charge was assessed on entrants, and it therefore led to an increase in the
incremental costs of all competitors. To understand why the "odd
asymmetry" and "tying" concerns are invalid, we need to reexanine in
more detail why it makes sense to treat successful stranded cost recovery
as raising incremental costs of all competitors by an equal amount,
regardless of the formal collection method. Answering the Court's concern
over competition for one formal method of collection thus answers them for
all formal methods with the same competitive consequences.
Assuming away differences in the administrative costs of

measuring and the legal issues of liability, etc., in these stylized examples,
it does not matter whether (1)the incumbent utility collects it directly from
departing customers, (2) a third party collects it directly from all
competitors or all customers, or (3) the incumbent collects it from entrants,
who incorporate it into the incremental cost of service, bill it to customers
and forward it to incumbents. The imputation principle means that
incumbents will impute the stranded cost recovery into the full incremental
cost of its own service regardless of whether it is charged to departing
customers directly or recovered by charges to entrants. By the same token,
customers who remain will pay a stranded cost charge, either explicitly
because the mechanism itself is recovered directly from all customers
regardless of who the supplier is, or because it becomes an imputed cost of
service by the incumbent that determines its choice of whether to supply
(that is, dispatch its own units) or wheel in the third-party power."'
These examples show the fundamental equivalence of the different
ways of thinking about stranded costs. To illustrate, let us return to Table
2. As we have done it here, we could imagine stranded cost recovery to be
a 1.5t charge by Utility A to all competing suppliers who are left to recover
the cost in their rates to customers. As we have seen, Utility A will impute
the same 1.5t charge to its own service, exactly the same as if a third party

51. The incentive of customers to leave the system to avoid paying for stranded costs
creates the impression that stranded costs are "created" by departing customers. In reality,
stranded costs are created by the discrepancy between the competitive wholesale price and
the embedded costs sunk in the prior regulatory regime. These stranded costs were there
before the transition, will be there as amortization during the transition and will be there
even if no customer leaves the system (See Utility B in Table 3).
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had assessed all utilities serving the region (including the incumbent) a 1.5€
fee and used the proceeds to amortize the stranded cost.
In the FERC's "revenues lost" approach, the 1.5€ charge is assessed
directly against all departing customers and the revenues are forwarded to
incumbents. But this leaves Utility B with exactly the same net revenues
(2.0t) from sales to customers in Utility A's service territory as if it had
collected the customer price of 3.5t and forwarded 1.5t to Utility A.
Obviously, this indifference also applies when the price of power allows
some, but not all, fixed costs to be recovered (Table 4).
The robustness of the various collection methods with regard to
competitive neutrality does not mean that other considerations such as
transparency and administrative costs might cause one method to be
preferred over another. However, our analysis does mean that the
conclusions regarding competition on equal terms are invariant to the
formal collection methods, as long as the methods are successful in actually
recovering the same valid measure of stranded costs.
We have shown that weak competitive neutrality is an extremely
robust property of successful transition charges that is independent of (1)
the differences in methods for assessing the charges (if there is no legal or
economic obstacle to actual recovery for each of the mechanisms), (2) the
general market conditions regarding the amount of excess capacity
expected, etc., and (3) the precise level of recovery allowed. Only strong
neutrality resolves the choice over the level of recovery, but it too remains
robust as to method of assessment and general market conditions. Strong
neutrality restricts the level to no more and no less than all stranded costs
during the transition.s
B. The Court's Concerns over Alleged Tying and Competitive
Asymmetry
This equivalence of equally effective recovery mechanisms insofar
as competitive neutrality permits us to return to the D.C. Circuit's concerns
in Cajun over tying and competitive asymmetry. First, the Court apparently
assumed that all fixed costs in perpetuity and not just stranded costs would
be recoverable by the mechanism. Critics who complain that stranded cost
recovery artificially gives "an entrenched competitor a paid-off asset with
which to compete with rivals" are making the same assumption. As

52. We have not addressed the duration of transition, which is itself potentially
controversial both analytically and politically. One possible way to define a relevant horizon
is to determine the point in time when it is expected that the present value of future revenue
requirements for generation (or other stranded assets) equal the present value of future

probable market revenues. From that day forward, a competitive market in generation could
be instituted with no remaining stranded costs.
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illustrated here, however, strong neutrality requires that the mechanism
apply only during the transition and only to recover fixed costs that are
indeed stranded. For the period in which the stranded cost recovery
mechanism is in effect, all competitors are subject to the same risk of
recovery of non-stranded costs on equal terms.
In a formal sense, there is no tying under the FERC's "revenues
lost" method in Order No. 888 because the charge is paid only by customers
seeking to exit the system. If a third party charging all competitors the same
fee does not constitute tying (and it cannot), then the functionally
equivalent other methods cannot either. This may answer the tying concerns
as a legal matter, but we have claimed that the competitive consequences
are invariant to the formal collection method under our assumptions. The
simple answer to the tying claim is that we have shown that all suppliers
face the same competitive wholesale price for power regardless of the level
of the stranded recovery charge. The recovery mechanism therefore cannot
foreclose effective competition as long as the wholesale market is
competitive.
Contrary to the Court's concern, if the recovery mechanism
achieves competitive neutrality, it becomes the exact opposite of a tying
arrangementrs The entire idea is to "untie" the stranded cost recovery from
service provided by the incumbent. Competition onequal terms permits
recovery of the legacy of the past regulatory system, regardless of which
firm the customer chooses, and permits all firms to compete on the basis of
true relative efficiency advantages on a going ahead basis.
With regard to the D.C. Circuit's concern in Cajun that recovery of
stranded costs represents a "deal killer," no "odd asymmetry" exists. Our
examples show that any differences in true economic efficiency remain
unchanged by the recovery mechanism and all utilities in the same market
face the same wholesale price of power. No asymmetry exists because each
utility competes on the basis of its true efficiency in markets beyond its
service territory, and recovers no revenues for stranded costs except from
its own prior customers. A successful recovery of stranded costs only means

53. The Court's concerns about "tying" are partly just ill-founded. First, marking up the
price of one good or service to recover an upstream cost is not tying; it is simply pricing to
recover total costs. For instance, aircraft companies recover research and development costs
in the price of airplanes, or insist that those design costs flow through regardless of quantity
of airplanes actually taken. Take-or-pay charges in gas and coal contracts cover the stranded,
that is, sunk, costs of exploration and development. Second, the stranded cost recovery
(access) charge does not require use of any other utility services beyond transmission;
customers are free to choose a third-party supplier. As shown herein, the access charge does
not distort this decision or encourage affiliate favoritism, as Iong as the charge is nonbypassable, due to the imputation principle. Thus, achieving strong neutrality eliminates all
of the Court's concerns.

Winter 1997]

THE ECONOMICS OF NEGATIVE BARRIERS

that the retail prices of power in different regions vary depending on the
local level of stranded costs. But these differ by exactly the amount
necessary to insure that all investments going forward can expect to earn
their cost of capital, while all operational efficiency advantages are
preserved.
C. Consequences of Measurement Errors in Recovering Stranded Costs
Strong competitive neutrality thus defines a successful stranded
cost recovery. This follows directly from (1) the definition of stranded costs
as sunk costs incurred only by incumbents as a result of legacies from the
prior regulatory regime, (2) the fact that incumbents will impute to their
own incremental costs any stranded cost recovery successfully assessed on
entrants, even if they are not assessed directly on customers, and (3) the fact
that any other level of stranded cost recovery undermines (if too low) or
overshoots (if too high) the incumbent's ability to expect to earn its cost of
capital. Successful assessment of stranded costs on all competitors in the
new competitive regime can never create competitive advantages or
disadvantages with regard to true efficiency differences going forward if
wholesale markets are effectively competitive. If critics of stranded cost
recovery mechanisms are right, it can only be because the recovery
mechanism in reality is doing something other than what it purports to do.
This, in turn, raises questions as to how the mechanism might go astray in
accomplishing its objectives.
Our results on the robustness of a successful stranded cost recovery
mechanism above foreshadow the results of errors in measuring and
recovering stranded costs. Biased mistakes in calculating the correct level
of stranded costs will indeed undercut the achievement of strong
competitive neutrality, an equal opportunity for all firms to recover costs
sunk in the prior regulatory regime and to expect to earn a rate of return
equal to the cost of capital. But the imputation rule means that even errors
in measuring stranded costs will leave true relative efficiency advantages
going forward unchanged (as long as the charges can be actually recovered
from customers and the mistakes do not threaten the survival of a
competitive wholesale market). That is, weak neutrality is achieved even by
a mis-estimated biased stranded cost allowance.
One possible source of an error might arise from claims that the
excess costs arise not from the legacy of the past regulatory regime but
rather from the legacy of past management mistakes. The 0.7t of additional
stranded costs in Utility B's service territory (over Utility A's) in Table 3
may be due to poor management, for example. However, there are a large
number of other plausible explanations for the difference, such as plant
vintage, type of fuel contracts, system load factor, or tax treatment. Given
the administrative costs of reviewing past decisions in a retroactive review,

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 37

the FERC in Order 888 has permitted the recovery of "legitimate and
prudent obligations that the utility undertook." As long as this creates
standards for the recovery of costs equivalent to a continuation of a regime
of fair regulation-the expectation of earning the cost of capital-this seems
a reasonable course. Recovery of stranded costs should seek to achieve
competition on equal terms during the transition, not to assign blame for the
cost burden of the prior regulatory regime. However, our examples do
illustrate the importance of identifying opportunities for mitigation,
creating incentives to pursue them, and assuring the eventual flow-through
of these benefits to customers.
Suppose, however, regulators err in setting the stranded asset
charge. For example, suppose in Table 3 that regulators establish Utility B's
stranded asset charge at 1.40 instead of 1.5€. All full incremental costs of
service and prices in Utility B's service territory will be lower by the
amount of the 0.1€ error. The opposite result will occur if regulators
erroneously set the fee in Utility C's territory at 0.1€ instead of zero. Note
that these errors could arise from either errors in forecasting future
wholesale prices, errors in estimating the future revenue requirement on the
incumbent's sunk costs from the prior regulatory environment, or perhaps
even errors in forecasting expected usage from a departing customer under
the exit fee approach.
If stranded costs are recovered in a competitively neutral way,
errors in measuring stranded costs will affect the overall level of rates and
the profitability of the incumbents, but not the inherent competitive
advantages or disadvantages of firms as measured by true efficiency
differences. This strong property of robustness with regard to weak
competitive neutrality holds even for any arbitrarily established, yet
successfully recovered, stranded access charge. (After all, if weak neutrality
holds for both the case where no recovery is allowed and where full
recovery is allowed, it must hold at any in-between level as well.) The
incumbent's imputation of the stranded cost charge will cause an effect on
the incumbent's full incremental cost of service equal to whatever happens
to be charged to its competitors.
However, this robustness with regard to weak competitive
neutrality does not mean one is indifferent to the level of the charge. Errors
in measuring stranded costs will have competitive consequences as far as
recovery of total costs (strong neutrality) are concerned. Underestimates
cause prices to be lower than otherwise and will tend to put a financial
squeeze on incumbents. The legacy of the past regulatory regime cannot be
properly funded and incumbents might even be bankrupted. Overestimates
will have the opposite effect, inflating final prices beyond the level
necessary to recover stranded costs and creating unwarranted excess profits
for the incumbent.
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A major source of possible error arises from failures to account for
mitigation. For example, suppose stranded costs for Utility A were
calculated as the 1.6o difference in total costs in Table 3, rather than the 1.5t.
The 0..1c difference in full incremental cost of service in lines 5 and 6 would
still be preserved (note that Utility B's imputation of stranded costs to its
own service increases by 0.1t as well). Customers would not realize the
benefits of Utility B's efficiency advantages during the transition as a result
of the error.
By the same token, assume that not all of Utility A's 1.5t in fixed
costs were actually sunk in the prior regulatory regime. If, say, 1.0t were
sunk in the prior regime, but 0.5¢ could be avoided entirely when it shut
down its generating plant, the 1.50 stranded cost recovery charge would
unnecessarily inflate rates in the transition by the 0.5t overestimate of true
stranded costs.'
To this point, we have assumed that all of the incumbents'
investments were incurred in the prior regulatory regime and the entrants'
investments were all made in the transition. In reality, incumbents are likely
to make additional investments after the transition. If competition on equal
terms is going to occur, it is important that new entrants and new
investments by incumbents not qualify for stranded cost recovery if all
customers go shopping "cold turkey," as we have assumed. Otherwise, the
recovery mechanism would be based on who made the investment, not
when the investment occurred. However, if not every customer goes
shopping on day one, lingering regulatory responsibilities could entail restranding of costs during the transition. These, too, might have to be
accounted for.
The answer to all this, as the D.C. Circuit in Cajun put it, is that the
measure of stranded costs should be "legitimate, verifiable, and accurately
calculated." The FERC stated that the charge was designed to compensate
for the "legitimate and prudent obligation the utility undertook." This
argues for doing the best job one can in measurement of stranded costs
(subject to possible "true ups," as discussed below). Collect them in a
competitively neutral way, and let competition take its course.

54. Some observers claim that considerable savings could be realized by shutting down
some of the existing generation, whose operating costs exceed the competitive price of
power that would emerge in a competitive market. Any such cost savings are true efficiency
gains and not stranded costs from the prior regulatory regime. See Roger W. Sant & Roger
F. Naill, Let 's Make Electricity Generation Competitive, ELEcTInc'Ty J., Oct. 1994, at 49-57.
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D. Possible Exception to the Competitive Neutrality Principle
Our principle that weak competitive neutrality is achieved is highly
dependent on our assumption that the stranded cost recovery mechanism
is "successful," that is, that retail prices are high enough to recover the
charge. This result might not be achieved, for example, if regulators allowed
the incumbent to treat all investment costs as sunk regardless of, first, when
they were made in the prior regulatory regime and whether they were
stranded or not, into the indefinite future, and, second, whether generation
markets were subject to effective competition. This combination of
assumptions could create a "first mover" advantage for the incumbent that
would not represent strong competitive neutrality. 5
Indeed, this appears to be the Court's concern in Cajun when it
questioned the competitive consequences "if a customer can charge a
former customer for the fixed cost of its product whether or not the
customer wants that product." Similarly, critics of stranded cost recovery
complain that "stranded cost recovery artificially gives an entrenched
competitor a paid-off asset with which to compete with rivals."
Whether an equally efficient firm can in general incur fixed cost and
enter into the market and compete on equal terms against an incumbent
employing such a pricing mechanism depends on how the price is
established. Consider the example in Table 4 and assume that a new entrant
with costs of 2.20 has no service territory, but must enter Utility A's service
territory and recover its fixed cost via charges to Utility A's customers.
Assume that the entrant makes an idiosyncratic investment that permits it
only to compete in Utility A's service territory, and that Utility A always
sets its stranded cost charge at its fixed cost of 1.5e regardless of whether it
has stranded costs or not. The entrant's total cost of service becomes
(1.5+2.2=) 3.7t in Utility A's service territory. If Utility A could set its rates
to be 3.7t, then the entrant can compete on equal terms. However, assume
that Utility A's rates are set to be 3.4€.06 The entrant cannot enter Utility A's
market profitably despite the fact that it is the long-run low cost provider

55. See William B. Tye, The Pricingof Inputs Sold to Competitors:Response, 11 YALE J.ON
Rsc. 203 (1994); See also William B. Tye & Carlos Lapuerta, The Economics of PricingNetwork

Interconnection:Theory and Application to the Marketfor Telecommunications in New Zealand, 13
YALE J.ON REG.419 (1996).
56. Such a failure to impute the full stranded costs could arise if the profit maximizing
monopolist's price in Utility A's service territory were below the market price of power plus
stranded costs. In this event, the monopolist could increase profits with the greater volume
of sales at the lower price.
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of service." More generally, if the entrant has already entered the Utility A
market, the 1.50 stranded cost charge will prevent it from recovering total
costs even though it is the most efficient provider. Such a pricing
mechanism will not achieve strong competitive neutrality because it will
violate the first three goals above."'
To prevent such a "price squeeze," some observers have recommended an "imputation rule" whereby the access charges to competitors
must be recovered by the incumbent in its customer rates."' However, such
rules against predation are made unnecessary in our examples by the
assumption that the stranded cost fee was set fairly by regulators, the
generation market was effectively competitive, and the stranded costs are
recovered successfully. To the extent these assumptions are not valid,
special competitive rules may be necessary to preserve competition in the
wholesale market.'
E. Ex Ante vs. Ex Post Calculation of Stranded Costs
We have assumed up to now that the stranded cost recovery
mechanism is established at a fixed level ex ante for some period of time
(maybe the entire transition period) before any "true up." We also assumed
that we knew for certain the true level of stranded costs, eliminating any
uncertainty about the appropriate charge. However, there might be a great
deal of uncertainty about the level of the necessary charge and a "true up"
may be necessary to ensure that customers benefit from true efficiency gains
as well as utilities. This raises the question as to whether a possible "true
up" would create an unfair competitive advantage to incumbents."

57. Note that the entrant could enter the market if it could still sell into the other service
territories at a competitive wholesale price of 2.2c.
58. In the example, Utility A would impute the 1.5€ into its incremental costs and prices
if it could.
59. For a general discussion, See Alfred E. Kahn & William E. Taylor, The Pricingof
Inputs Sold to Competitors: "Comment," 11 YAL J.ON REG. 225 (1994). In addition, William J.
Baumol, Januscz Ordover, & Robert D. Willig, ParityPricing& Its Critics:Necessary Condition
for Efficiency in Provisionof Bottleneck Services to Competitors(14 YALE J.oN ReG. 145 (1997)),
propose an automatic flow through mechanism that requires the incumbent to discount all
recovery of access fees to entrants by the same measure of any discount to the customers to
maintain competitive neutrality.
60. Note also that we assumed that the stranded cost recovery was achieved by a onepart rate design with no demand charges. This may not necessarily be the most efficient rate
design. If, instead, the recovery is part of a demand charge, the mechanism is clearly
competitively neutral as long as the charge is non-bypassable.
61. Those who objected to the recovery of stranded costs in Cajun complained that
buyers and sellers would be reluctant to engage in off-system sales because the uncertainty
over future stranded cost recovery would become a "deal killer." See James D. Pembroke,
After Cajun, What Next for Stranded Costs?, ELwcRIucrryJ., Oct. 1994, at 42-48.
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The general rule is that, assuming all else equal, an ex post resetting
of stranded cost recovery has the same competitive consequences as an
accurate ex ante mechanism-it will be competitively neutral. Done
correctly, both methods tend to have similar consequences for the risks
borne by new investments. Risks on old investments may differ depending
on the method chosen for the "true up," and this would have to be
accounted for in the allowed return on investment in stranded cost during
the transition.
To see the competitive neutrality of a fairly applied "true up"
mechanism, let us amend the previous hypotheticals to see what
consequences for competition on equal terms emerge. Suppose in Table 3
there is a completely new entrant with no service territory under the old
regulatory regime, and thus has incurred no sunk costs prior to the
transition to deregulation. According to the third goal, any such
investments should be accorded no protection against risks of wholesale
market conditions in the new competitive environment. As a result of excess
capacity, the market price is only 1.9€, the level that barely permits Utility
A to recover its marginal costs without the stranded cost charge. To
determine the competitive impact on the efficient entrant, we must consider
whether the future price is correctly anticipated and, if not, whether the
erroneous forecast is corrected at a later date through a "true up."
Suppose in the first instance that the future market price is correctly
forecasted at the time the stranded cost recovery charge is calculated. The
stranded cost recovery is now (3.4-1.9=) 1.5t, since all of Utility A's sunk
cost from the prior regime qualifies as a stranded cost. The efficient entrant
in this case suffers no competitive disadvantage since it should not enter the
market even though it is the lowest total cost competitor. In fact, it will not
enter the market regardless of whether or not Utility A recovers stranded
cost. Since it has advance knowledge that rates will go to 1.9€ in the absence
of a stranded cost recovery, it is no worse off under recovery than without
a stranded cost recovery.' Since the wholesale market price the entrant
faces is the same regardless of whether or not Utility A recovers its stranded
cost, the potential entrant will receive the correct incentive not to enter. Put
another way, the efficient entrant fully faces the risks of future market
conditions, regardless of the stranded cost recovery, but that is exactly what
should happen.
Suppose, for example, that regulators had no idea what might
happen to prices. Rather than attempt to project the necessary stranded cost

62. Note that the entrant has zero net revenues in the world where rates fall to Utility
A's incremental costs and there is no stranded cost recovery and remain at zero when the
stranded cost recovery is set at 1.5t. In both cases, the potential entrant is unable to recover
its fixed cost of 0.3t and will not enter.
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charge to account for the expected future market conditions, they took a
"wait and see" approach. In this case, the accounting for the price change
will be left to the marketplace results. If so, after some period of time, there
would be a "true up" and the stranded cost recovery charge would be reset
at 1.50 to account for the inability to forecast prices. Given our assumptions
about how prices are established, this will cause retail prices to equal
(1.9+1.5=) 3.4c. Utility A will clearly be made whole because it will now
recover total costs at a price of 3.4t. The entrant, however, will not benefit
because its incremental costs simultaneously go up by the 1.5t increase in
the stranded cost levy. However, its losses due to the wholesale price of 1.9t
are exactly the same that would have occurred had there been no "true up."
Utility C fully bears all risks of price changes in the future. This is exactly
the result our third goal for stranded cost recovery calls for. The entrant is
going to bear the same risk regardless of whether or not stranded cost
recovery is extended to Utility A, and regardless of whether it is set ex ante
or ex post.
However, risks for incumbents will depend on whether a "true-up"
mechanism is implemented. For example, consider the more general case
in Table 4 and assume that the stranded cost charge for Utility A is set at
0.5t based on a 2.2t projection of the price for market power. Suppose now
that a 0.5t decline in market prices was unanticipated and there is no "true
up." All utilities will lose 0.5t as a result of the 0.5t decline in price. As long
as the 0.5t stranded cost recovery mechanism is in place for Utility A, it
(and all utilities) will bear the same risk of market fluctuations and errors
in forecasting the magnitude of stranded costs. If, however, Utility A's
stranded cost recovery fee is trued-up periodically, it will be shielded from
additional future market risk after the true-up. Either way, the stranded
cost recovery mechanism nevertheless remains competitively neutral in the
weak sense (full incremental cost of service differences do not change). Note
again the robustness of the weak dimension of competitive neutrality with
regard to changes in assumptions about stranded cost recovery.
Use of ex post methods, however, will affect the allocation of risk
between the incumbent utility and its ratepayers. These differences would
have to be accounted for in the allowed rate of return on investments in
stranded costs. The topic goes beyond the subject of this article, but a few
comments are in order.
There are three natural benchmarks useful for assessing the risk
and correct allowed rate of return for the recovery of stranded costs. The
first is the allowed rate of return under the prior regulatory regime. To the
extent regulators choose a transition scheme for recovery of stranded costs
that reproduced the risks the utility would have faced under continued
regulation, this would be the appropriate allowed return.
The second benchmark is relevant if the stranded cost recovery
mechanism mimicked the risk of a completely new investment. Then the
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appropriate allowed return would be the new cost of capital under the
competitive regime.
Third, and at the other extreme, regulators in theory could design
a scheme to eliminate much of the stranded cost recovery risk, although it
would be difficult to eliminate it all. In this case, a rate lower than the
regulatory allowed rate of return in the prior regulatory regime would be
appropriate.

Given the uncertainty surrounding some of the stranded cost
estimates,' there may be no actuarially fair method for setting the ex ante
stranded cost levy. This would argue for use of an ex post mechanism, with
perhaps the utility choosing to bear some of the risks of variances between
resettings (with, of course, proper compensation for the risk, just as under
traditional regulation). Another alternative is that.stranded cost recovery
could be treated as part of a performance-based regulation (PBR) system for
the utility during the transition.
The proper approach may well differ from one utility to another or
from one cost category to another. Where the magnitude of the obligation
is reasonably certain, incentives to mitigate are likely maximized and
regulatory burden minimized by use of the ex ante approach. For example,
if there is a clear market-based estimate of stranded costs, it may be
preferable to fund this amount only, letting the utility (or some third party)
bear the risk of future developments (properly compensated for the risk, of
course). Where there is greater uncertainty and management control is
minimal," particularly about unknown future cost responsibilities such as
a hazardous waste cleanup, the ex post approach would appear necessary.6
However, regulators can account fully for the idiosyncratic problems of
coming up with methods that create an ex ante expectation of earning the
cost of capital, knowing that weak competitive neutrality is likely to be
robust with regard to any reasonable means of successfully recovering the
sunk costs of the prior regime.

63. See Thomas Feiler & Christopher Seiple, Electric Stranded Investment: Not as Much as
You Think, Pus. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 15,1995, at 10-11.
64. Mitigation incentives present something of a paradox. They are clearly strongest
under an ex ante approach, but are most needed when there is large uncertainty about the
magnitude-which argues for an ex post approach. The paradox arises because mitigation
itself provides information about what the true level of stranded cost really is.
65. Many incentive schemes failed when experience proved far different from ex ante
expectations. See Johannes P. Pfeifenberger & William B. Tye, Handle with Care: A Primer on
Incentive Regulation, 23 ENRGY POL'Y 769 (1995).
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F. Considerations in Choosing Among Alternative Mechanisms for
Stranded Cost Recovery
To date, the FERC in Order 888 has strongly embraced the "exit
fee" approach to electric wholesale stranded costs recovery, with
recoverable amounts to be estimated on the basis of "revenues lost." No
specific means of calculating these terms have been identified and, absent
such details, it is not yet clear how reliable a recovery mechanism this may
prove to be. It is possible that the exit fee/revenues lost approach will be
more contentious and challenged as less effective than available
alternatives. In particular, it may be alleged that exit fees are
anticompetitive (as they are imposed precisely at the time that a customer
contemplates leaving the system for a specific alternative supplier) and
arbitrary (as they could easily differ considerably from customer to
customer as a function of date of departure). Moreover, the calculations
underlying an estimate of "lost revenues" are by no means simple or
completely objective, as there is uncertainty over what volumes and prices
the departing customer would have continued to experience as a full
requirements customer. Many of these issues will certainly be revisited at
the state level. Various industry participants may wish to consider
alternatives to exit fees as time goes on. These are discussed in more detail
in the following sections.
IV. HISTORY OF DEREGULATION AND ORIGIN OF STRANDED
COSTS IN THE NATURAL GAS PIPELINE INDUSTRY
It sometimes appears that the federal experience in deregulating
wellhead gas prices and in unbundling of pipeline transportation services
provides a model for electric industry restructuring. In particular, it seems
that the important problems of "transition costs" and "stranded costs" are
being anticipated by the FERC and by State regulatory commissions which
are considering electric retail access. The gas industry experience is indeed
instructive, revealing how a protracted and ambiguous restructuring can
aggravate the stranded cost problem," how the courts can and will become
involved if regulation does not create stranded cost recovery mechanisms

66. The almost decade-long process of moving from FERC Order 380 (1984) through
Orders 436,500,497, and 636 (1992) created a hybrid market of regulated and competitive
prices that customers could use selectively, under a "lower of cost or market" purchasing
strategy, This exacerbated the sunk cost recovery problem (for out-of-market gas supply
contracts) and encouraged uneconomic bypass.
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that pay sufficient regard to the fair needs of investors,67 and how stranded
cost recovery mechanisms can be designed. Curiously, the FERC seems to
have heeded the first two lessons closely while essentially ignoring its own
experience in the area of stranded cost recovery mechanisms.
Three main segments exist in the natural gas industry: production,
transmission, and distribution. Transmission originally consisted of
pipelines buying price-controlled gas "at the wellhead" (that is, from gas
producers), transporting it, and reselling it "at the city gate" to gas
distribution companies, who supplied it to final customers. Today, the
pipelines perform only a transportation function, while their customers
(which include distribution companies, large commercial and industrial
retail customers, and gas marketers and resellers) buy their own gas at
unregulated, market prices from producers. The transmission and
distribution segments remain regulated. This section focuses on the impact
of wellhead price deregulation and pipeline transmission access on
stranded costs for the pipeline sector. We begin with a brief recapitulation
of the regulatory restructuring process to reveal the parallels and
precedents for the current electric situation. Then we describe several of the
mechanisms for stranded cost and transition cost recovery that the FERC
approved.
A. Major Steps in Gas Deregulation
The root of the gas industry's stranded cost problem was Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin," in which the Supreme Court held that the
price of natural gas shipped over interstate pipelines could be legally
regulated at the wellhead by the Federal Power Commission (FPC).
Initially, gas prices were set on a cost of service basis, but this proved to be
complicated due to the widely varying characteristics of different supply
basins, so the FPC switched to simplifying rules based, for example, on
region and type of well. The low prices allowed by the FPC sometimes
provided little incentive to develop new gas supplies for sale to interstate
pipelines. By the mid-1970s, these prices had not increased enough to keep
pace with the per million British thermal units (MMBtu) value of competing
sources of energy, especially oil after the supply disruptions of 1973-74, so
gas for interstate sale was in very short supply.6

67. FERC Order 500 was the result of the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit,
remanding Order 436, in part on grounds that it had not given pipeline investors a means
of recovering stranded costs associated with prudent but expensive supply contracts.
68. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
69. The fact that the intrastate market for gas was unregulated resulted in gas supplies
being diverted away from the interstate market, exacerbating the shortages in that market.
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To remedy the shortage, the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) of 1978
charged a successor to the FPC, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC), with administering a complex system for raising the price of newly
developed natural gas. The NGPA system kept regulated prices on "old"
gas at their previous low levels, but permitted much higher (though still
regulated) prices on "new" gas. The intent was to induce new supply while
preventing "windfall profits" on gas supplies developed under prior
wellhead price controls.
Throughout this time, the actual price the pipelines charged for gas
was a volume-weighted average of the wellhead prices on old and new gas
combined, so the prices on new gas contracts could be far above the average
delivered price without suppressing demand for the gas. Moreover, the
NGPA process of repricing began at a time of record energy prices (1979,
another oil market disruption) that were widely expected to go even higher
in the future. Therefore, the price of new gas could be well above the
current market price while not being above the expected future market
price-or so those who designed the NGPA hoped.
Unfortunately, the NGPA price trajectories for new wellhead
supplies were based on expectations for high gas demand and high oil
prices that never materialized. In actuality, the high energy prices of 1979
and the early 1980s brought forth increased energy efficiency and reduced
demand. There was also a significant recession of the U.S. economy in 198183, and the world price of oil dropped substantially in the mid 1980s. The
result was that gas pipelines had signed long-term contracts for new
supplies at prices far above what the market soon proved able to support.
Moreover, the higher prices for new wellhead supplies induced a great deal
of drilling and development activity, creating a supply surplus. A highly
seasonal spot gas supply market emerged around 1984 with summer gas

prices at roughly half of many pipelines' weighted average costs of gas, and
up to four or five times lower than the price of the highest cost contracts in
a typical pipeline's portfolio. The so-called "supply bubble" was born.
The out-of-market pipeline supply contracts for new gas almost all
included substantial "take-or-pay" guarantees to gas producers: If the
pipeline could not take delivery and sell the gas, it would nonetheless pay
for the vast majority of it (typically 60-90 percent of annual deliverability).
Such take-or-pay clauses had long been a feature of gas supply contracts.
Such guarantees survived into the NGPA era for several reasons. One was
that the pipelines' business environment had been one of chronic gas
shortage, in which they could always sell any gas available. Regulated
wellhead prices meant the pipelines could not simply bid more to induce
new supply. Instead, they offered non-price inducements to producers, such
as high take-or-pay levels, to try to secure additional supplies. Extending
these terms when new gas began to be available was natural, especially
when prices were expected to continue to rise in the future.
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Second, the regulatory mechanism had been set up so pipelines
were somewhat indifferent to the price of the gas, at least as long as their
market franchise remained intact. The pipelines' "merchant function"
consisted of buying the gas at the wellhead and selling it at the city gate to
their customers (primarily gas distribution companies) at the pipelines'
average actual out-of-pocket cost. The pipelines simply secured gas supplies
for customers, without profit to themselves. Their profits consisted of the
return on the pipeline assets used to transport the gas, which were only
affected by the cost of gas to the extent that high prices threatened volume
reductions or customer losses.
Third, many of the pipelines were hedged against the risk that the
gas might be unmarketable by the "minimum bill" provisions in their tariffs
with distribution companies: If the distribution companies could not sell the
gas, they nonetheless were obligated to pay the pipelines' "minimum bill."
The minimum bill was the pipelines' downstream version of the take-orpay charge, which effectively guaranteed the distribution company's share
of the pipelines' upstream take-or-pay obligations with producers.
By the early-1980s, the new gas supplies secured at high prices were
generating billions of dollars of excess cost. "Business as usual" regulation
would have passed these costs through to final customers, for whom the
supplies had been secured in the first place, by having producers invoke
their take-or-pay clauses with pipelines and pipelines invoke their
minimum bill provisions with distribution companies. However, highpriced gas had to compete with low-priced oil, especially for industrial
customers with dual-fuel equipment. Moreover, the price run-up created
complaints from residential customers and others who lacked the
equipment to switch fuels readily. These problems set the stage for an
unprecedented series of regulatory orders and court decisions that left all
segments of the natural gas industry confused about the rules for most of
a decade, and which created the pipelines' stranded cost problem.
The process began on June 1,1984, when the FERC issued Order
No. 380, Elimination of Variable Costs from Certain Natural Gas Pipeline
Minimum Commodity Bill Provisions. Order 380 eliminated the minimum
bill resale provisions between pipelines and distribution companies without
relieving the take-or-pay provisions between producers and pipelines. The
pipelines (with FERC approval) attempted to minimize their take-or-pay
costs by "special marketing programs." These programs gave special
discounts on gas (negotiated with producers in exchange for take-or-pay
concessions) to customers who might otherwise switch immediately to oil.
Since customers without alternative fuel capability could not participate in
these arrangements, the courts struck down such programs as unduly
discriminatory in 1985. On October 18, 1985, the FERC issued Order No.
436, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines after Partial Wellhead Decontrol.
Order 436 required non-discriminatory transportation services of gas
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owned by others, so pipelines would be unable to favor their own gas,
without any provision for recovery of take-or-pay costs. Together, Order
380 and Order 436 left pipelines facing insolvency-threatening losses from
their supposedly risk-free, profit-free gas merchant function.
The regulatory and legal history from this point through the early
1990s is extremely tangled, with FERC orders issued, remanded by the
courts, reissued while the remand was appealed, and so on. For example,
the FERC attempted to accelerate wellhead price decontrol in 1986 with
Order No. 451, only to have the order struck down by the 5th Circuit Court
of Appeals in 1989, in a decision that was itself reversed by the Supreme
Court in 1991. The Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989 achieved
complete wellhead price decontrol as of January 1,1993.
The most important threads in this history with regard to stranded
costs are Order 436 and its progeny. (Order 436 had five additions or
modifications, Orders 436-A through E, in 1985-87.) With minor
refinements, each version required pipelines to offer firm and interruptible
transportation services in addition to continuing to provide their sales, or
"merchant" service. Firm sales customers were entitled to forego pipeline
gas and use interruptible transportation to buy spot gas, which they did
extensively during the summer. Order 436 also included schedules for
customers to convert their firm sales service gradually to firm
transportation and release the pipeline from its residual obligation to serve.
Unfortunately for the pipelines, those conversion rights endowed customers
with more flexibility than the pipelines generally enjoyed upstream in their
supply contracts with producers. These two types of customer flexibilities
(interruptible transportation (IT) and firm conversions), coupled with Order
380's cancellation of minimum bills, created the stranded cost (take-or-pay)
problem for the pipelines.
Order 436 was partially struck down (remanded to the FERC) in
1987 by the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, in large part because of the
inadequacy of these provisions for pipeline take-or-pay losses, and it was
replaced by Order No. 500, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines after Partial
Wellhead Decontrol, on August 14, 1987. Order 500 itself had many
additions or modifications, sometimes in response to the courts, reaching
Order No. 500-I by 1990. The chief feature that distinguished Order 500
from Order 436 was a provision for a sharing of take-or-pay losses between
a pipeline and its customers, through unrecovered cost allowances and the
creation of Gas Inventory Cost surcharges, or GICs. These were,
respectively, the stranded cost recovery and future avoidance mechanisms
for pipelines during the period preceding the final restructuring in 1992,
Order 636 (described below).
Under Order 500, pipelines could attempt to recover their past takeor-pay costs or contract buyout costs in either of two ways: by putting 100
percent of such payments into the Purchased Gas Adjustment Clause
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(PGAC) as commodity charges (where many such costs would not be
collectible, given customers' flexibility), or by writing off between 25 and
50 percent (chosen by the pipeline), putting that same percent into a
demand charge, and putting the remaining portion (not more than 50
percent) into the PGAC. This "equitable sharing" arrangement, whereby the
pipeline abandoned part of its claim for full recovery, allowed the pipeline
a rebuttable presumption of prudence for buying down the out-of-market
contracts. Both alternatives, though better than nothing, were financially
inadequate, resulting in a multi-billion dollar unrecovered cost problem for
the pipelines, in addition to the out-of-market costs that were absorbed by
producers and customers.'
Order 500 also created GICs to cover the future supply costs of
being obligated to serve while not being assured of each buyer's minimum
take. The motivating idea was that pipelines were holding certain gas
supplies or supply contracts in reserve or in "inventory" to cover future
demand uncertainty, and those carrying costs needed to be included in the
allowed costs of service. There were no explicit rules about what rate
structure or valuation formula had to be used in designing a GIC; each
pipeline proposed its own terms, often in accord with settlement
discussions with customers. (More details about GIC design are discussed
below.)
The final step (so far) in the transition to deregulated gas pipeline
services was Order 636, proposed as the so-called "Mega-NOPR" in 1991
and issued in 1992 to become effective in 1993. (Order No. 636-A, Order
Denying Rehearing in Part, Granting Rehearing in Part, and Clarifying
Order No. 636, August 3, 1992, spells out the details.) The ostensible
objective was to achieve "comparability" of service between gas supplied
by third parties for pipeline delivery and gas obtained by the pipeline for
its firm sales customers. The practical effect of Order 636 was to remove
pipelines from the merchant business entirely. As a result, today it is up to
pipeline customers to identify and contract for all their own gas supplies,
either directly or through marketers and resellers. Order 636 provides for
a "straight fixed-variable" rate design, to recover pipelines' fixed costs

70. The exact amount of take-or-pay costs or buyout/buydown costs is not known.
Pipeline industry studies by trade associations and the FERC estimated the costs at around
$10-15 billion. But renegotiated contracts were marked to different estimates of what the
future market price would be, which may have impaired or enhanced future cost recovery
according to how good an estimate was made. Columbia Gas Transmission Co. believed it
had adequately restructured its supply contracts by buying them down to around $3.00/Mcf
in 1984, but this estimate proved to be so far above the eventual market price that Columbia
filed for bankruptcy and used bankruptcy protections to reject its producer contracts. United
Gas Pipeline also used bankruptcy to deal with its contractual commitments, and others
(especially Transcontinental Energy Company) only narrowly escaped bankruptcy.
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through fixed charges to firm transportation capacity holders, such as gas
distribution companies. In return, such customers can use or resell their
pipeline transmission capacity entitlements in the secondary market, subject
to a price cap at the straight fixed variable (SFV) rate.'
In regard to new restructuring transition costs and remaining
unamortized stranded costs, there were two issues raised by Order 636.
First, the industry continued to have some out-of-market gas contracts that
had not been renegotiated, in part because the excess gas supply induced
by regulation proved to be much longer lived than most anticipated. More
generally, Order 636 completely eliminated the merchant function, hence
the need for pipelines to hold gas supply contracts, so all previous supply
contracts needed to be canceled or assigned. The future costs of
renegotiating such contracts were deemed "Gas Supply Restructuring"
(GSR) costs. Second, the industry faced some new stranded asset costs
associated with resources that had been needed for merchant service but
were not necessary for transportation only, such as gathering facilities,
storage gas inventories, and contracts for transportation capacity on
upstream pipelines. Finally, the industry faced new transition costs
associated with improved metering, accounting, and information services
such as electronic bulletin boards to support and monitor all customers'
activities as transporters.
These restructuring costs were to be 100 percent recoverable,
though somewhat at risk 10 percent of the estimated costs were allocated
to interruptible transportation (IT) services and 90 percent to firm transportation (Fr)customers (collected as a demand charge). Once pipelines have
collected enough IT revenues to recover the allocated costs, they credit 90
percent of the excess to Fr customers and retain 10 percent for their
shareholders.
B. Pipeline Stranded Cost Recovery and Avoidance Mechanisms
Thus we see that the FERC has addressed stranded costs and
transitional restructuring costs on at least two occasions for the pipeline
industry: First, with take-or-pay buyout/buydown recovery allowances and
future gas supply inventory charges (GICs) in 1987 under Order 500, and
then for all remaining, but obsolete, merchant service costs and for newservice restructuring costs in 1992 under Order 636.

71.

This shift in responsibility for supply procurement and pipeline released capacity

management has increased the risks for gas distribution companies, long the safest part of
the gas industry.Thus they now have the potential to face stranded costs if they should have

to pay for unneeded gas or pipeline capacity.
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An interesting feature of pipeline stranded cost recovery
mechanisms has been their diversity and flexibility of form and value,
relative to the rather strict preference that the FERC has stated to date for
the electric industry to utilize exit fees calculated under a "revenues lost"
formula. As noted above, the FERC allowed two approaches for recovering
past take-or-pay liabilities in Order 500-100 percent recovery through
commodity charges, subject to a prudency review, or a partial waiver by the
pipeline of recovery claims, a demand charge allowance for the same
amount, and the residual collected on a commodity basis with a rebuttable
presumption of prudence.
Pipeline GICs were really stranded cost avoidance or prevention
charges, rather than recovery mechanisms. They could take an even greater
variety of forms, including pre-paid demand charges or ex-post "deficiency
charges" to be paid per (thousand cubic feet) Mcf not taken below the
quantities deemed reasonable to have expected given the customers'
current firm sales entitlement. They could be based on marginal costs (such
as the costs of the gas supply-contracts at the top of the "dispatch" order for
the pipeline's gas procurement, or the costs of a whole portfolio of
hypothetical, new gas contracts) or on average costs (such as the pipeline's
weighted average supply cost). They could include costs directly associated
with carrying gas reserves (such as expected take-or-pay payments or gas
supply price premiums or prepayments to producers for warranting
supply) and indirect costs such as extra handling fees for gas purchased for,
but ultimately not delivered to, merchant customers (for example, storage
injections and holding costs, or the costs of discounting gas below spot
market levels to be assured of "dumping" it back onto the market). The
target volumes which would trigger customer responsibility for making
GIC payments could be set annually or monthly.
Moreover, such costs did not have to be estimated once and for all;
GICs were tariffs that were to be re-estimated at periodic intervals (typically
three years, corresponding to base rate cases), with true-ups as needed and
appropriate. By the mid-1980s, the gas industry had a well-developed and
highly visible spot market, which was often the reference point for GIC cost
estimates, but there was no standard or required reference point used by all,
nor were homogeneous standards of supply reliability imposed by the
FERC on the industry. Each GIC was designed and approved on a case-bycase basis. Importantly, GICs were not exit fees. They were collected
universally, from all firm sales customers and from customers who began
as sales customers but chose to convert to firm transportation. In essence,
they represented the unbundling of the reliability portion of gas supply
costs. For most pipelines, the associated supply inventory carrying costs
were largely sunk (that is, tied to their existing portfolio), but for some these
were recurring, prospective costs of maintaining and expanding inventories
as well.
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The GICs approved by the FERC for Texas Eastern Transmission
Corporation (TETCo) and Tennessee Gas Pipeline (TGP) demonstrate the
flexibility granted to the pipelines in designing these mechanisms (though
not all pipelines filed or had their GICs approved). TETCo's deficiencybased GIC consisted of a commodity charge calculated each month at 20
percent of TETCo's weighted average cost of gas. This rate was assessed
against customer purchase deficiencies below 60 percent of annual contract
demand. TETCo's GIC mechanism did not conform strictly to Order 500
regulations. Nonetheless, the FERC approved the GIC (which was part of
a larger settlement) because it was supported by TETCo's firm sales
customers and was not opposed by any of the state utility commissions
which had jurisdiction over TETCo's distribution customers3
Tennessee Gas Pipeline initially proposed a market-based GIC as
part of a restructuring of its sales and transportation services. Its mechanism
consisted of a monthly demand charge per Mcf of maximum contractual
entitlement and a gas commodity rate equal to the average unit gas price in
each month of a hypothetical portfolio of new gas contracts, capped at the
average of index prices for gas delivered onshore Louisiana to eight
pipelines.' Before the FERC ever acted on TGP's initial proposal, TGP
proposed a transition GIC (TGIC) as part of a comprehensive settlement
two and a half years after the initial filing. This proposal also consisted of
a demand rate and a gas rate capped at 102 percent of a market index based
on an average of spot prices in three regions for eight pipelines.74 The FERC
eventually approved an amended version of TGP's settlement which
shortened the TGIC period and froze the demand rate in return for
customers' agreement to maintain firm service elections throughout the
TGIC period.7
There are perhaps three main lessons from this experience to
borrow and apply to the electric industry. First, stranded costs are so
difficult to estimate that flexible, adaptive, and preventive mechanisms for
their recovery ought to be allowed. This flexibility can include allowing

72. FERC Majority Approves Texas Eastern Proposal for Gas Inventory Charge, Despite
Failure to Conform to Certain Order No. 500 Guidelines, Due to Strong Support by All Firm
Sales Customers Subject to the Charge, FosT=R NAT. GAS REP., Sept. 29, 1988, at 2-7.
73. Tennessee Proposes Restructuring of Sales and Transportation Services, Including
Fixed Demand Charge to Compensate Tennessee for Standing Ready to Supply Gas, FOSTER
NAT. GAS REP., Dec. 22, 1988, at 17-20.
74. Tennessee Submits Comprehensive Settlement Offer to Resolve Take-or-Pay Cost
Recovery Issues, Establish Two-Year Interim GIC,Substantially Restructure Services and
Enhance Comparability of Sales and Transportation Services, Fosr= NAT. GAS REP., Jul. 3,
1991, at 1-9.
75. FERC Approves Amended Version of Tennessee's "Cosmic" Settlement Until
Implementation of Order No. 636 Restructuring; Also Approves Related Settlements of
Midwestern and East Tennessee, FOSTE NAT. GAS REP., Jun. 25,1992, at 8-11.
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different means of estimating costs, different means of collecting them, and
different means of resetting the allowances. Second, lump-sum, pay-whenyou-go approaches (such as the FERC's proposed electric exit fees) are not
strictly necessary, nor are they necessarily preferred by customers. Both
customers and the utilities may prefer the clarity of a charge like a GIC that
is unbundled regardless of customer switching to third-party suppliers.
Finally, if electric utilities should choose to bear a portion of their
restructuring costs, as pipelines did in amortizing their contract buydown
costs under Order 500, then the utilities should be granted a rebuttable
presumption of prudence in incurring and recovering such costs.
V. STRANDED COSTS IN THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
The telecommunications industry is today quite diverse and
increasingly competitive, with numerous providers of several types of long
distance, local, and related voice, data, and image communications services.
A bit more than a decade ago, it was an institutionally simpler, more
regulated industry, and the transition from then to the present entailed
significant restructuring costs, some of which were "stranded" or
unrecovered due to bypass of the incumbent providers' systems. Today,
many fixed and sunk costs appear at risk of being stranded in the near
future, as the local telephone service companies face a competitive threat
from the lifting of restrictions on long distance carriers competing in the
local, previously franchise-protected markets.
By and large, the telecommunications industry has not had quite as
grim a net exposure to bypass stranded costs as is now anticipated for the
electric industry, though its gross exposure was fairly high---estimated by
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to be roughly four billion
dollars per year for the Bell operating companies and GTE (combined)
throughout the late 1980s. The net exposure to financial loss has been much
lower than this, largely because there has been very significant growth in
the overall demand for telecommunication services that offset much of the
problem of assets being underutilized or profits being inadequate.
However, the industry has developed some accounting, pricing, and
ratemaking policies that proved useful in reducing the exposure to bypass
and the controversy over stranded costs, and these can be borrowed
fruitfully by the electric industry.
A. Background on Telecommunications Restructuring
AT&T was the monopoly provider of long distance and intrastate
local services for most of the United States until the early 1980s. In 1982,
AT&T agreed to divest its Bell operating companies (the companies
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providing intrastate service) as part of a settlement of a federal antitrust
suit. 6 As a result, seven regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs) were
formally spun-off from AT&T in 1984. These seven companies were
prohibited from entering the long distance and equipment manufacturing
markets and were required to provide "equal access" to and from
interexchange carriers (or IXCs, that is, long distance phone companies).
AT&T remained in the long-distance and equipment manufacturing
businesses (and was allowed to enter the computer business). The 22
regional subsidiaries of the RBOCs, or BOCs such as New York Telephone
or New England Telephone, were granted near-monopoly franchises for
local telephone service, with the exception that the FCC allowed one nonRBOC cellular phone company to enter the market in each metropolitan
area. There were also many other, generally much smaller, regulated "local
exchange carriers," or LECs, with monopoly franchises comparable to the
BOCs. These were companies that had been providing local services before
the AT&T breakup but were unaffiliated with AT&T. (All BOCs are LECs
but not necessarily vice versa.) Prior to 1984, the bypass and stranded cost
problem was primarily a problem for AT&T, whereas after 1984, the
problem was to be faced by the LECs.
Although the 1984 divestiture marked the formal beginning of fullscale competition in the long distance market, selective competition (and
bypass of AT&T's long distance and local networks) had already started
emerging as early as the 1960s. One explanation for the emergence of
competition had to do with AT&T's rate structure. This structure consisted
of local service rates that were heavily subsidized by long distance service
rates. Often, long distance service was priced at a level several times above
its incremental or even replacement costs of service, with the excess margins
flowing back to reduce local service rates. This cross-subsidy was deemed
necessary and appropriate in the interests of achieving "universal
service"r-the idea that the AT&T network was more valuable the more
comprehensively it interconnected all parties in the country.
In1969, MCI, looking to take advantage of this rate structure, was
allowed to offer private point-to-point communications services between St.
Louis and Chicago using microwave and satellite technology. The
customers for this type of service were high volume long distance users
who were providing most of the cross-subsidies under AT&T's rate
structure (for example, companies with offices in more than one city that
needed to communicate with each other extensively). With private, pointto-point service, MCI provided these customers with the means to bypass
the entire AT&T network (both local and long distance networks) and the
associated charges, at least for their intra-corporate communications.

76. This settlement is known as the Modified Final Judgement.
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In the 1970s, MCI was further allowed to provide public
interexchange services, when it was given access to local telephone
networks in other cities. Thus MCI was able to offer long distance services
which competed directly with those of AT&T. Unlike the point-to-point
services previously offered by MCI, these public interexchange services did
not allow for total bypass of the AT&T network because MCI calls would
terminate on AT&T's (more specifically, one of the Bell operating
company's) local network High volume users therefore provided the
demand-side impetus for competition in the telephone industry in the same
way that large industrial users are currently demanding competition in the
electric industry. Similarly, low cost new communications technology
(microwave, satellites, fiber optics, digital switches, etc.) provided the
impetus on the supply side, much like the dramatic cost reductions in gas
turbines and combined cycle stations that have stimulated competition in
the electric supply business.
MCI expanded its long distance network into the 1980s with a
continued focus on high volume users. In addition to microwave and
satellite technology, MCI (like other DC entrants) also aggressively
developed a fiber optic network. With the divestiture of AT&T in 1984 and
the formal opening of the long distance markets, MCI was well poised to
take market share from AT&T (including a piece of the residential market).
In 1984, AT&T had a 90 percent share of the long distance telephone
market. By 1993, AT&T's share had dropped to 58 percent, with MCI and
Sprint picking up 18 percent and 10 percent, respectively, with a few
smaller companies and many resellers of AT&T, MCI, or Sprint services
splitting the remaining 14 percent.7
After the divestiture, competition problems also started to confront
the LECs in the local service markets. The impetus once again was largely
pricing: The cross-subsidies of the old AT&T tariff structure were
reincarnated in the form of usage-based access charges to the LECs that are
still in use today. Long distance calls which originate or terminate on the
LEC networks (that is, those not conducted over private lines) pay an access
fee for each minute of use to the LECs on both ends of the call. This fee is
substantial-roughly 65 percent of the typical long distance call cost in 1984,
now more like 30-40 percent. Because the access charge is usage-based
when the associated costs of providing an DC interconnection are almost
entirely fixed, the access charges also are disproportionately burdened on
high volume users. Because of this, through the mid- to late-1980s, many of

77. See FCC, Trends in Telephone Service (February 1995). By 1993 there were roughly
500 resellers with revenues of $6 billion. Resellers aggregate small customers and then
provide service for them under a large-customer tariff service from one of the major IXCs.
In effect, they are performing a sort of tariff bypass rather than a physical bypass.
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the LECs collected a very significant portion of their revenues from a very
small number of large, high traffic customers like American Express or
Sears. It was not uncommon for 1 percent of customers to provide as much
as 30 percent of total revenues from local services and another 20 percent
of total revenues from long distance access charges. This made such
customers very attractive bypass candidates, with correspondingly huge
financial risks for the LECs.O
Figure 1 displays how bypass occurs in the telecommunications
industry. Point-to-point communications services allow for complete bypass
of the entire telephone network, perhaps through the use of satellites. Thus,
complete bypass allows a customer to avoid the LEC network both in the
city where the call is originated and in the city where the call is terminated,
as well as the IXC long-distance network In such complete bypass, both the
DC and the LECs forego fixed cost contributions, and they may even have
physically stranded assets. Partial bypass occurs when long distance calls
still originate or terminate using one of the LEC's networks. Thus, a
customer may bypass the LEC network in the city where the call is
originated, but may still use both the XC network and the LEC network in
the city where the call is terminated. Competitive Access Providers (CAPs),
such as Teleport and MFS Communications, originally entered the
telecommunications business by offering these partial bypass services.
Specifically, CAPs were allowed to start installing lines to meet the needs
of high volume users within major cities. These lines interconnected directly
with interexchange carriers, thereby bypassing the access charges of the
LEC in the city where the call originated. Initially, only the wires of the LEC
were bypassed. More recently, however, the CAPs have been installing their
own switching offices, thereby allowing for bypass of the LEC switching
office. Bypass can also be described as "facilities bypass" or "service
bypass." Facilities bypass (which may be complete or partial) describes a
situation in which the LEC's (and perhaps IXC's) facilities are being
bypassed through the use of an alternative facility (such as a microwave or
satellite system). A more common situation involves "service bypass,"
whereby the LECs simply forego the access charges they would have
otherwise collected for long distance service accessed over the public
switched networks in order to retain the local service. The DCCs are often the
biggest facilities bypassers of the LECs, but the LECs often participate in
this kind of bypass themselves, by installing and leasing private lines which
allow their large customers to connect directly to the DC networks." The
78. Common Carrier Bureau, FCC, Third Report on Bypass of the Public Switched
Network (May 26, 1987).
79. FCC, Monitoring Report in Docket No. 87-339 (1987) (excerpted from Common
Carrier Bureau, FCC, Third Report on Bypass of the Public Switched Network (May 26,
1987)).
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idea is that it is better to capture the private line revenues from the
bypassing customers if you are going to lose their access fees anyway.
Generally the LECs were allowed and able to reassign unrecovered
costs of service lost to bypass to other remaining customers, but this wasnot
a universally popular solution. The LECs also responded to the emerging
bypass competition in other ways. In Massachusetts, for example, the
Department of Public Utilities allowed NYNEX to offer discounts to large
customers.
Because of the reallocation of bypassed costs back onto remaining
smaller customers, the issue of bypass was a much-discussed topic in the
telecommunications industry. In the 1980s, the Federal Communications
Commission undertook a series of annual studies on the issue of bypass.
These studies confirmed that a great deal of bypass was taking place and
that it could lead to higher rates for captive customers.
Revenue losses from bypass activities are recovered by charging
higher rates to remaining customers-residential subscribers and small
business customers who are unable to bypass the nation's public switched
network. Thus, the initial impact of bypass is felt by customers who remain
on the public switched system rather than the telephone companies
themselves.W
Similarly, an August 1986 General Accounting Office report stated,
"Local telephone customers could face billions [of dollars] in rate increases
if the local telephone companies lose their large-volume customers due to
bypass."81 Note that similar concerns about the impact on residential and
small commercial customers have been expressed in the recent debate over
the restructuring of the electric industry.
It is difficult to quantify the amount of bypass that has occurred in
the telephone industry. Perhaps the main reason for this is that bypassers
were performing a competitive transaction that was entirely legal and they
were under no obligation to report their activities. Nonetheless, local
telephone companies attempted to monitor the amount of bypass taking
place on their systems, and they submitted bypass reports to the FCC in
which they estimated total losses due to bypass. In 1992, the last year that
the FCC reported bypass statistics in its Monitoring Report, the RBOCs (and
GTE) estimated that total losses due to bypass in 1990 were 131.5 billion
switched minutes of use or $4.5 billion in revenue terms, roughly 5 percent
of 1992 RBOC revenues.82 Of this, the vast majority was due to foregone
IXC access fees. (Bypass attributable solely to CAPs appears to be small.
Total revenues of competitive access providers were only $191 million in

80. Id.
81.

Id.

82.

See Chapter 6, FCC, Monitoring Report (1992).
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1993, a tiny fraction of the $95 billion in revenues earned by local exchange
carriers. Revenues from intrastate or interstate access were $96 million for
the CAPs and $31 billion for local exchange carriers.' Nonetheless, the
CAPs are growing rapidly and positioning themselves for future
competition in the local exchange markets.")
Competition is now poised to intensify much further in both the
long distance and local exchange markets. Federal legislation recently
passed will allow the RBOCs to enter the market for long distance services
served by the interexchange carriers, and vice versa. In the local exchange
markets, the legislation will expose RBOCs to new competition from cable
companies. Competition from CAPs is likely to increase and providers of
wireless services and electric utilities may also be future competitors.
Long distance volume growth has been significant since divestiture,
with interstate switched access minutes growing from 167 billion in 1985 to
402 billion in 1994, or roughly 10 percent per year.s Volume growth in local
services has also been quite large. As discussed further below, this rapid
growth largely explains why the issue of stranded costs has not been as
controversial an issue in the telecommunications industry as it appears to
be becoming in the electric industry.
B. Stranded Cost Magnitudes and Recovery
Mechanisms in the Phone Industry
Evidence of a stranded cost problem in the telecommunications
industry is revealed in the regulatory strategy of several RBOCs in the late
1980s and early 1990s, and in the large write-offs taken by all of the RBOCs
in the last few years. In the 1984-1992 period, several of the RBOCs were
able to obtain regulatory authorizations, from both the FCC as well as state
regulators, for accelerated depreciation rates to more accurately reflect asset
obsolescence. In particular, existing copper cable networks were still
functional for basic voice services, but not adequate for the new highvolume data and image transfers that required high bandwidth fiber optic
cable. Relatedly, analog switches could not support the enhanced service
offerings (such as 800-line messages) that required sophisticated processing.

83. See Trends in Telephone Service, supra note 77.
84. MFS Communications' revenues more than doubled from $109 million in 1992 to
$287 million in 1994. Furthermore, MFS increased its fiber system route miles from 200 to
2,387 between 1989 and 1994. The CAPs as a whole have increased fiber system route miles
from 673 to 9,304 over that time period. See FCC, Fiber Deployment Update End of Year 1994
(July 1995).
'85. See Trends in Telephone Service, supranote 77; see also FCC, Monitoring Report in
Docket No. 87-339 (May 1995). Switched access minutes represent minutes transmitted by
long distance carriers that also use the distribution networks of local phone companies.
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Thus the depreciation rate on such assets was stepped up, and the assets
themselves were retired somewhat earlier than had been expected at their
installation. Some of these depreciation accelerations were taken not only
for more accurate financial reporting purposes, but also to increase capital
recovery through increased revenue requirements. For example,
Southwestern Bell Corporation reported in 1985:
Depreciation and amortization expense increased
significantly in 1985 due to an increase in the amount of
property, plant and equipment and a more accelerated rate of
depreciation authorized for the Telephone Company by the
FCC. This increased level of depreciation has also been
authorized in the determination of revenue requirements in
the state jurisdictions in which the Telephone Company
operates. Although the provision for depreciation has
increased, capital recovery of the Telephone Company is still
not consistent with the actual consumption of telephone
plant. During 1986, the Telephone Company will seek
approval from the FCC to depreciate its plant at a faster rate
in order to recover costs over a period more consistent with
actual consumption of the plant."
Table 5 summarizes increases in depreciation expense due to
accelerated depreciation rates for a few of the RBOCs.
In general, faster depredation may well be warranted in
anticipation of increased competition under restructuring. Cost of service
regulation typically amortizes capital equipment over its estimated useful
engineering life, while competition may render some equipment outmoded
and economically obsolete well before it becomes non-functional. Thus
economic depreciation lives may be shorter than engineering lives, a
distinction brought to the light at restructuring of regulated industries.
Accelerated write-offs (with increased revenue allowances prior to
restructuring) are a good means of repositioning the industry for
competition.
This strategy of accelerating plant depreciation is now being
considered by some electric companies to mitigate their exposure to
stranded generation.' The argument goes that certain generation assets
now face premature obsolescence, while transmission and distribution may
have a longer life than previously reflected in accounts. Reassigning past

86. Southwestern Bell Corporation, 1985 Annual Report.
87. For instance, Public Service Electric & Gas recently proposed a transfer of roughly
$200 mm of depreciation reserve from transmission and distribution (deemed to be overdepreciated) to generation (deemed to be under-depreciated), and to also alter the rates of
depreciation on the net remaining plant of both types in the same direction.
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depreciation from transmission and distribution to generation, and then
decreasing the rate of recovery on to-go transmission and distribution
depreciation reduces the risk of unrecoverable (stranded) costs once
competitive access begins. (In this situation, the adjustment is revenueneutral but not risk-neutral.)

TABLES5
Increases in Depreciation~ Expense Due to
Accelerated Depreciation Rates
($Millions)

Yea

______

~

______

U Ala tic

1985

NY NE
$127

1986

$331

$33

1987

$137

$156

1988
1989

$93

1990

$36

1991

$43

$266

1992

$150

$160

1993

g6

Note:
Includes amortization of depreciation reserve
deficiencies.
Source:
Company Annual Reports
Further evidence of the telecommunications stranded cost problem
can be seen in unrecovered write-offs taken by all of the RBOCs in the past
two years. Table 6 summarizes these write-offs.
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TABLE 6,
Wrt-offs Taken By -RBOCs asa-Rsult:of,:
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Bell
Atlantic
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BellSouth
NYNEX
Pacific
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SBC
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Quarter 1995
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Third Quarter
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Source: Value Line
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___
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$3.15

$8.3

$5.9

$2.30

$8.2

$6.1

$2.25

$7.8

$6.1

$2.70

$14.4

$12.50

$2.92

$8.6

$6.1"

$3.30

$5.2

$2.1"

$2.80

$8.4

$6.4*

-

*•

-

IIII

These write-offs are the result of the RBOCs discontinuing the use
of regulatory accounting under SFAS 71 and further shortening the
depreciable life of telephone plant, including copper and fiber cable, digital
switches and circuits, and analog switches. Again, they reflect the RBOCs
significant investments in technologies that have become economically
obsolete before they become functionally obsolete. Some of the
technological improvements in the telecommunications industry have an
analogy in the electric industry, for example, where new generation
technology allows for higher performance generating plants that can be
built and operated at a lower cost than even the going-forward costs of
some older, sunk capacity.
The telecommunications write-offs represent a one-time "catch-up"
which is necessary when a company shortens the depreciable lives of assets
due to a faster rate of obsolescence. By and large, this more recent
shortening of asset lives was done for financial reporting purposes only.
The change did not affect accounting for regulatory purposes. That is, these
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write-offs did not appear in the regulatory books as rate base reductions,
nor were these 1990s write-offs designed to increase capital recovery
through increased revenue requirements.
The obvious question then is why are the RBOCs taking these
uncompensated write-offs? The main reason seems to be simply that the
RBOCs are predominantly no longer under rate of return regulation, as
discussed further below. The RBOCs believe that "competition, market
conditions and the development of broadband technology, more than prices
established by regulators, will determine the future revenues."" Thus,
abandoning the traditional accounting rules (which tend to overstate asset
lives in order to reduce rates under cost-of-service regulation) gives a more
accurate matching of revenues and expenses for financial reporting reasons.
More importantly, it serves to focus the company's management more on
market-based pricing and less on the outdated view that more capital
invested automatically means more profits.
Of course, write-offs on financial statements are only a recognition
that there is a stranded cost problem and in no way should be taken as
mitigation of the problem, much less a solution. The point is that the
industry has been able to mitigate the stranded cost problem despite the
write-offs.
Although such financial statement evidence seems to reveal that
stranded costs have been an issue, the term "stranded costs" (used
extensively in the current debate over deregulation of the electric sector) has
not been used in the telephone industry until recently. In the local exchange
markets, as facilities of RBOCs have been bypassed as a result of entry by
CAPs, the phrase "lost contribution" has been used (referring to
contribution to fixed assets). Nonetheless, both phrases allude to a situation
in which competitive or market rates are less than those that were or would
be allowed under revenue requirements (that is, traditional cost of service)
ratemaking.
The RBOCs have of course been anxious to offset and/or
discourage the revenue losses from bypass using a stranded cost recovery
mechanism, though again they have not referred to it as such. The primary
mechanism used by the RBOCs has been the access fee. Thus, when
NYNEX, for example, loses a high volume customer in downtown Boston
to MFS Communications, NYNEX recovers a portion of the lost revenues by
charging an access fee for any call originated by the high volume customer
that terminates over NYNEX facilities. The access fee consists of the
incremental cost of using the NYNEX facilities plus a contribution to fixed
costs (equal to the contribution that would have been received had a
NYNEX customer originated the call). However, there is no attribution of

88. US West, 1993 Annual Report.
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foregone "revenues lost" when setting the access fee. Rather, access charges
are set to recover a significant portion of an RBOC's fixed costs from all
customers. In effect, this assures that the customer will make a contribution
regardless of carrier.
Using the phone industry as a model for the electric industry would
suggest the use of an access or "wires" charge for customers opting to
purchase power from a source other than the utility that originally supplied
the power (such as an independent power producer or another utility). The
access charge would be in the form of either a transmission surcharge or a
distribution surcharge (or both). This type of charge has been suggested as
a stranded cost recovery mechanism by the New York Public Service
Commission staff in its recently announced restructuring proposal. One
valid criticism of the access fee approach in the phone industry is that
because it is collected as a variable charge (that is, charged per minute of
use), it has the effect of suppressing usage for price-sensitive customers,
when in fact no costs are avoided. The electric industry need not imitate this
feature of telecommunications pricing. A demand-charge access fee would
be more efficient and more collectible.
As indicated in the introduction to this section, the issue of stranded
costs in the telecommunications industry has not as yet seen nearly the
controversy that it portends in the electric industry. The main reason is a
fundamental difference between these two industries: The telecommunications industry is experiencing rapid growth while the electric industry is
comparatively stagnant. Thus, the LECs are not concerned about small
market share gains by CAPs because the LECs are achieving high revenue
growth regardless of bypass, simply because demand for telecommunications services is growing. Thus when, for example, NYNEX loses a customer
to a CAP, there is not necessarily any physical stranding of lines previously
assigned to the departed customer. The reason is that a new customer may
move into the same building (or a building next door) and NYNEX will use
the abandoned lines for the new customer. Furthermore, in the telecommunications industry there is no asset that is quite analogous to generating
plants in the electric industry. (Switches are perhaps closest, but they are
really integral to transmission control.) This means there is no "stage" of
telecommunications production that is peculiarly at risk of being physically
stranded (unlike the case with electric generating plants). Nonetheless, even
with no physical stranding, assets used for telecommunications services can
be stranded financially.
In contrast to their telecommunications counterparts, electric
utilities do not have the luxury of rapid market growth, so they are unlikely
to be able to grow their way out of a stranded cost problem. Inparticular,
the electric industry does not yet have a complementary growth industry
to spur its own growth, such as the high growth computer and infomedia
industries that have spurred much of the telecommunications boom.
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Another key difference between the two industries is that the
telecommunications industry is now predominantly under price-cap
regulation rather than traditional cost-of-service (that is, profit) regulation.
The FCC allowed AT&T to switch to price-cap regulation in 1989, and
several state utility commissions have allowed the RBOCs to switch to
price-cap regulation in recent years. Price-cap regulation and the growth in
the demand for telecommunications services have contributed to the
financial health of the local exchange carriers, partly mitigating what would
otherwise be a contentious stranded cost situation. As indicated above, this
price-cap regulation has decoupled rates from costs enough that the BOCs
felt comfortable taking large write-offs with no adjustments to allowed
revenues.
Finally, there is an even more basic reason for the financial health
of the LECs and the corresponding lack of concern over the issue of
stranded costs. By and large, LECs still have strong near-monopoly status
in the local markets they serve. In 1994, local exchange carriers received 40
percent of their revenue ($40 billion) from local exchange service, with a
large portion of the balance collected through access charges from
interexchange carriers for originating and terminating long distance calls.
In 1994, local exchange carriers received approximately one-third of their
revenue ($31 billion) from these access charges to interexchange carriers."
To date, these local monopoly franchises have been secure enough to make
overall revenue collection not too risky. But the issue of stranded costs
could become more controversial in the telephone industry when
competition becomes more widespread. If cable companies or the
interexchange carriers become significant competitors in the local exchange
markets, or if state regulatory commissions order access fees (both those
charged to CAPs and to interexchange carriers) to be based on incremental
costs without including a contribution to fixed costs, then the RBOCs will
face a significant stranded cost problem. These prospects are not necessarily
remote.
The "Universal Service Obligation" (USO) in telecommunications
markets around the world illustrates a problem structurally similar to that
of stranded costs in the U.S. electric utility industry. The USO arises because
telecommunications regulators have long sought to promote widespread
telephone subscriptions by cross-subsidizing service to residences and rural
areas. If incumbents, but not entrants, were obligated to preserve the crosssubsidy, there would be an artificial incentive for customers, especially
large industrials, to bypass the incumbent's system and choose to be served
by new entrants. These in turn might succeed only because the lack of

89.

See Trends in Telephone Service, supra note 77.
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competitive neutrality of the cross-subsidy mechanism" creates
opportunities for "cream skimming.""
Government authorities in New Zealand' recently proposed to deal
with the alleged financial consequences of New Zealand's version of the
"Universal Service Obligation," the "Kiwi Share Obligation" (KSO). They
proposed to bifurcate this issue so that any resolution of this problem is
done in a "competitively neutral" way that does not impede procompetitive objectives of interconnection policy:
In the case of telecommunications, it may not be possible to
choose the interconnection pricing rule in such a way as to
achieve both the goal of economic efficiency and the goal of
efficient handling of the cost of a social obligation (such as the
Kiwi Share). Therefore, these two goals are separated. The
question of the economically efficient access pricing rule in
the absence of the social obligation is considered first,
followed by the question of the efficient method of handling
the social obligation itself. (Footnote omitted) (pp. 7-8)
A method of handling social obligations should, primarily,
seek to promote economic efficiency. In this context economic
efficiency is promoted by estimating and allocating the costs
of the obligation. In particular, this will involve allocating the
costs of the obligation in such a way that no firm is given a
competitive advantage or disadvantage. (p. 9)
Much of the New Zealand report addresses issues of access pricing
that, according to the bifurcation concept, do not concern us here. The
important point is that stranded costs are just one category of costs that
should be recovered in a competitively neutral way. Also, we should look
to a broad range of experience to determine how revenue neutrality can be
accomplished.
The notion of bifurcation implies that any legacy of regulation such
as the USO should first be funded in a competitively neutral way. Then the
pricing of access to bottleneck facilities (or terms of mutual interconnection)
can be accomplished by whatever pricing mechanisms that are appropriate
to the particular transition to competition desired. According to the

90. Integrated retail suppliers of electricity in the United States could, of course, find
themselves facing similar permanent asymmetries from "lifeline" rates, integrated revenue
planning, etc., unless these programs were funded in a competitively neutral way.
91. As a sample, see Alfred E. Kahn, A FreeTicket to Rich Telecom Markets, WALL ST.J.,
Nov. 10, 1995, at A-15, which is essentially an argument about asymmetric risks faced by
incumbents and entrants.
92. Regulation of Access to Vertically-Integrated Natural Monopolies, The Ministry of
Commerce and the Treasury of New Zealand (Wellington, New Zealand: August 1995).
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bifurcation concept, pricing of access to markets newly opened to
competition involves three steps:
1. Develop a verifiable estimate of the magnitude of the
required funding for stranded costs;93
2. Limit the recovery of stranded costs to only that level
required to achieve competitive neutrality; and
3. Develop a pro-competitive access policy independent of the
competitively neutral recovery mechanism for stranded costs.
The United Kingdom's OFTEL has also proposed creative
mechanisms for dealing with the Universal Service Obligation in that
country."4 The proposal involves quantifying the amount of burden, if any,
and funding it through a separate account to which all telecommunications
services contribute periodically on a non-discriminatory basis. The account
cannot be tapped for unrelated purposes, cannot be funded exclusively by
one network provider, and can be accessed equally by any competitor that
provides services deemed to be burdensome.
VI. SUMMARY OF STRANDED COST
RECOVERY LESSONS FOR ELECTRICS
As noted, the telecommunications industry is not a perfect analog
for the electric industry, largely because of its extremely strong growth.
However, the telecommunications industry has had a significant bypass
problem which causes "lost contributions" or stranded costs, and they have
used a few mechanisms that could be very attractive to electric utilities:
1. Accelerated depreciation of at-risk assets: These are copper
cables and analog switches for telecommunications, primarily
generation for utilities. A swap of depreciation between
transmission and generation could achieve this without any
rate increases.
2. Access charges: Somewhat like GICs used in the gas
pipeline industry, the telecommunications industry has
addressed its transition costs with a recovery mechanism that
is applied globally, to all customers rather than with a

customer-specific exit fee. Access fees may be significantly
simpler administratively than the exit fee approach, especially
at the retail level. Unlike the telecommunications industry,

93. Note that this estimate could, at least in theory, be done on an ex ante or ex post
approach. See discussion above.
94. A Framework for Effective Competition, Consultative Document, issued by the
Director General of Telecommunications, Office of Telecommunications (December 1994)
(available upon request from the authors).
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the electric industry could seek to make its access charges
non-bypassable and non-distorting, that is, demand charges
not usage (per kWh) charges.
3. Price-cap regulation: A shift to price-cap regulation was
justified in the telecommunications industry because of its
high growth and rapidly emerging competition in all aspects
of supply. The electric industry is not quite so naturally
poised, but there is a potentially valuable role for incentive
regulation of some kind during restructuring. However, it
will prove both difficult and controversial to forecast
expected stranded costs, net of reasonable mitigation. An
incentive scheme could allow "light-handed" regulation of
the stranded cost recovery mechanism itself, for example, by
allowing revenue-requirement mitigating cost reductions to
be shared between ratepayers and shareholders. This would
give utility managers a stronger, unambiguous incentive to
find such opportunities, and customers assurance that they
are participating in such savings without onerous regulatory
reviews.
VH. SUMMARY: THE PARADOX OF THE
ROBUSTNESS PROPERTY OF COMPETITIVE
NEUTRALITY FOR STRANDED COST RECOVERY
Much of the discussion to date of the competitive neutrality of
stranded cost recovery has focused on the issue of its effect on the ability of
competitors to realize the benefits of true efficiency differences going
forward (weak competitive neutrality). But as long as the charge is
successfully recovered from customers in a non-discriminatory manner,
then virtually any recovery mechanism (even one that gets the wrong
number) will satisfy this very weak test as long as wholesale markets
remain competitive. Perhaps paradoxically, the fact that a particular
mechanism and recovery amount is competitively neutral in this sense tells
us little about whether it is desirable or not. For that, we need to determine
whether it meets the test of strong neutrality, allowing all competitors an
equal opportunity going forward to expect to earn the cost of capital. By the
same token, any recovery mechanism that successfully accomplishes
neutrality in this more meaningful sense can ordinarily be expected to be
competitively neutral in regard to preserving the relative competitive
advantages of true efficiency differences going forward. The implication for
the debate over stranded cost recovery is clear: the weak competitive
neutrality issue should simply be put aside. Instead we must focus our
attention on getting the stranded cost number right. The real tasks ahead
are (1) achieving administratively feasible ways of correctly measuring and
recovering stranded costs and (2) achieving effective competition in the
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wholesale market for power, so that the transition to competition may truly
begin on equal terms.
Acronyms
Bell operating companies
BOC
Competitive Access Providers
CAPs
Contracts for differences
CFDs
Federal Communications Commission
FCC
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
FERC
Federal Power Commission
FPC
Firm transportation
FT
Gas Inventory Charge
GIC
Gas Supply Restructuring
GSR
Interruptible transportation
IT
Interexchange carriers
IXCs
Kiwi Share Obligation
KSO
Kilowatt hour
kWh
Local exchange carriers
LECs
Thousand cubic feet
Mcf
Million British thermal units
MMBtu
Megawatt hour
MWh
Natural Gas Policy Act
NGPA
Office of Telecommunications
OFTEL
Performance-based regulation
PBR
Purchased Gas Adjustment Clause
PGAC
Regional Bell operating companies
RBOC
Regional electric companies
RECs
Statement of Financial Accounting Standard 71
SFAS 71
Straight fixed variable
SFV
Transition gas inventory charge
TGIC
Universal Service Obligation
USO

